Difference between revisions of "Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures"

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!style="width:16ex"| CVE
 
!style="width:16ex"| CVE
 
! Announced !! Affects !! Severity !! Attack is... !! Flaw !! Net
 
! Announced !! Affects !! Severity !! Attack is... !! Flaw !! Net
 +
|-
 +
| Pre-BIP protocol changes
 +
| n/a
 +
| All Bitcoin clients
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Netsplit<ref name="Netsplit"/>
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Implicit<ref name="hardfork">This is a protocol "hard-fork" that old clients will reject as invalid and must therefore not be used.</ref>
 +
| [[Consensus versions|Various hardforks and softforks]]
 +
|bgcolor=lime| 100%
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2010-5137|CVE-2010-5137]]
 
| [[#CVE-2010-5137|CVE-2010-5137]]
Line 57: Line 65:
 
|bgcolor=lime| Very hard
 
|bgcolor=lime| Very hard
 
| Transaction overwriting
 
| Transaction overwriting
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-1909.html 99%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-1909.html 100%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2012-1910|CVE-2012-1910]]
 
| [[#CVE-2012-1910|CVE-2012-1910]]
Line 72: Line 80:
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Fake Conf<ref name="FakeConf">Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation</ref>
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Fake Conf<ref name="FakeConf">Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation</ref>
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
| Mandatory P2SH protocol update
+
| Softfork: P2SH
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/BIP-0016.html 99%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/BIP-0016.html 100%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2012-2459|CVE-2012-2459]]
 
| [[#CVE-2012-2459|CVE-2012-2459]]
Line 81: Line 89:
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
| Block hash collision (via merkle root)
 
| Block hash collision (via merkle root)
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-2459.html 99%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-2459.html 100%]
 
<!--
 
<!--
 
|-
 
|-
Line 99: Line 107:
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
| (Lack of) orphan txn resource limits
 
| (Lack of) orphan txn resource limits
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20123789 99%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20123789 100%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2012-4682|CVE-2012-4682]]
 
| [[#CVE-2012-4682|CVE-2012-4682]]
Line 107: Line 115:
 
|  
 
|  
 
|  
 
|  
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4682.html 98%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4682.html 100%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| '''[[CVE-2012-4683]]'''
 
| '''[[CVE-2012-4683]]'''
Line 115: Line 123:
 
| bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
| bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
| Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
 
| Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4683.html 98%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4683.html 100%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| '''[[CVE-2012-4684]]'''
 
| '''[[CVE-2012-4684]]'''
Line 123: Line 131:
 
| bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
| bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
| Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
 
| Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20124684 98%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20124684 100%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2013-2272|CVE-2013-2272]]
 
| [[#CVE-2013-2272|CVE-2013-2272]]
Line 131: Line 139:
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
| Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
 
| Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132272 97%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132272 99.99%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2013-2273|CVE-2013-2273]]
 
| [[#CVE-2013-2273|CVE-2013-2273]]
Line 139: Line 147:
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Easy
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Easy
 
| Predictable change output
 
| Predictable change output
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132273 97%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132273 99.99%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2013-2292|CVE-2013-2292]]
 
| [[#CVE-2013-2292|CVE-2013-2292]]
Line 155: Line 163:
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
| Continuous hard disk seek
 
| Continuous hard disk seek
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132293 97%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132293 99.99%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2013-3219|CVE-2013-3219]]
 
| [[#CVE-2013-3219|CVE-2013-3219]]
Line 171: Line 179:
 
|bgcolor=lime| Hard
 
|bgcolor=lime| Hard
 
| Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
 
| Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20133220 97%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20133220 99.99%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#BIP-0034|BIP 0034]]
 
| [[#BIP-0034|BIP 0034]]
Line 178: Line 186:
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Fake Conf<ref name="FakeConf"/>
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Fake Conf<ref name="FakeConf"/>
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
| Mandatory block protocol update
+
| Softfork: Height in coinbase
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/BIP-0034.html 99%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/BIP-0034.html 100%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#BIP-0050|BIP 0050]]
 
| [[#BIP-0050|BIP 0050]]
Line 187: Line 195:
 
|bgcolor=pink| Implicit<ref name="hardfork">This is a protocol "hard-fork" that old clients will reject as invalid and must therefore not be used.</ref>
 
|bgcolor=pink| Implicit<ref name="hardfork">This is a protocol "hard-fork" that old clients will reject as invalid and must therefore not be used.</ref>
 
| Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
 
| Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?50 97%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?50 99.99%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2013-4627|CVE-2013-4627]]
 
| [[#CVE-2013-4627|CVE-2013-4627]]
Line 195: Line 203:
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Easy
 
|bgcolor=yellow| Easy
 
| Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
 
| Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20134627 57%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20134627 99.9%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2013-4165|CVE-2013-4165]]
 
| [[#CVE-2013-4165|CVE-2013-4165]]
Line 203: Line 211:
 
|bgcolor=lime| Local
 
|bgcolor=lime| Local
 
| Timing leak in RPC authentication
 
| Timing leak in RPC authentication
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20134165 57%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20134165 99.9%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2013-5700|CVE-2013-5700]]
 
| [[#CVE-2013-5700|CVE-2013-5700]]
Line 211: Line 219:
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
| Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
 
| Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20135700 61%]
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20135700 99.9%]
 
|-
 
|-
 
| [[#CVE-2014-0160|CVE-2014-0160]]
 
| [[#CVE-2014-0160|CVE-2014-0160]]
Line 223: Line 231:
 
| CVE-2015-3641
 
| CVE-2015-3641
 
| 2014-07-07
 
| 2014-07-07
| Bitcoind and QT prior to 0.10.2
+
| bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.10.2
 
|bgcolor=yellow| DoS<ref name="DoS"/>
 
|bgcolor=yellow| DoS<ref name="DoS"/>
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 
| (Yet) Unspecified DoS
 
| (Yet) Unspecified DoS
|  
+
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20135700 99.9%]
 +
|-
 +
| BIP 66
 +
| 2015-02-13
 +
| All Bitcoin clients
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Fake Conf<ref name="FakeConf">Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation</ref>
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
 +
| Softfork: Strict DER signatures
 +
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?66 99%]
 +
|-
 +
| BIP 65
 +
| 2015-11-12
 +
| All Bitcoin clients
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Fake Conf<ref name="FakeConf">Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation</ref>
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
 +
| Softfork: OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY
 +
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?65 99%]
 +
|-
 +
| BIPs 68, 112 & 113
 +
| 2016-04-11
 +
| All Bitcoin clients
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Fake Conf<ref name="FakeConf">Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation</ref>
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
 +
| Softforks: Rel locktime, CSV & MTP locktime
 +
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?68 99%]
 +
|-
 +
| BIPs 141, 143 & 147
 +
| 2016-10-27
 +
| All Bitcoin clients
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Fake Conf<ref name="FakeConf">Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation</ref>
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
 +
| Softfork: Segwit
 +
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?141 99%]
 +
|-
 +
| [[#CVE-2016-8889|CVE-2016-8889]]
 +
| 2016-10-27
 +
| Bitcoin Knots GUI 0.11.0 - 0.13.0
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Exposure
 +
|bgcolor=lime| Hard
 +
| Debug console history storing sensitive info
 +
|bgcolor=lime| 100%
 
|-
 
|-
 
| CVE-2017-9230
 
| CVE-2017-9230
Line 235: Line 283:
 
| ?
 
| ?
 
| ASICBoost
 
| ASICBoost
 +
|bgcolor=pink| 0%
 
|-
 
|-
| CVE-2017-12842
+
| BIP 148
 +
| 2017-03-12
 +
| All Bitcoin clients
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Fake Conf<ref name="FakeConf">Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation</ref>
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
 +
| Softfork: Segwit UASF
 +
| ?
 +
|-
 +
| [[#CVE-2017-12842|CVE-2017-12842]]
 
| 2018-06-09
 
| 2018-06-09
 
|
 
|
 
|
 
|
 
|
 
|
 +
| No commitment to block merkle tree depth
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-July/016189.html CVE-2016-10724]
 +
| 2018-07-02
 +
| bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.13.0
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| DoS<ref name="DoS"/>
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Keyholders<ref name="KeyholderEasy">Attacking requires signing with the publicly-disclosed alert key</ref>
 +
| Alert memory exhaustion
 +
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201610724 99%]
 +
|-
 +
| [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-July/016189.html CVE-2016-10725]
 +
| 2018-07-02
 +
| bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.13.0
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| DoS<ref name="DoS"/>
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Keyholders<ref name="KeyholderEasy">Attacking requires signing with the publicly-disclosed alert key</ref>
 +
| Final alert cancellation
 +
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201610724 99%]
 +
|-
 +
| [[#CVE-2018-17144|CVE-2018-17144]]
 +
| 2018-09-17
 +
| bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.16.3
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Inflation<ref name="inflation"/>
 +
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy"/>
 +
| Missing check for duplicate inputs
 +
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201817144 62%]
 +
|-
 +
| [https://medium.com/@lukedashjr/cve-2018-20587-advisory-and-full-disclosure-a3105551e78b CVE-2018-20587]
 +
| 2019-02-08
 +
| Bitcoin Knots prior to 0.17.1, and all current Bitcoin Core releases
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Theft<ref name="theft-local-timing">Local attacker could potentially determine the RPC passphrase via a timing sidechannel.</ref>
 +
|bgcolor=lime| Local
 +
| No alert for RPC service binding failure
 +
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201820587 1%]
 +
|-
 +
| [[#CVE-2017-18350|CVE-2017-18350]]
 +
| 2019-06-22
 +
| bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.15.1
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Unknown
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Varies<ref>Depends on software configuration</ref>
 +
| Buffer overflow from SOCKS proxy
 +
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201718350 89%]
 +
|-
 +
| [[#CVE-2018-20586|CVE-2018-20586]]
 +
| 2019-06-22
 +
| bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.17.1
 
|
 
|
 
|
 
|
 +
| TBD
 +
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?201820586 50%]
 +
|-
 +
| [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-September/002174.html CVE-2019-12998]
 +
| 2019-08-30
 +
| c-lightning prior to 0.7.1
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Theft
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 +
| Missing check of channel funding UTXO
 +
|-
 +
| [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-September/002174.html CVE-2019-12999]
 +
| 2019-08-30
 +
| lnd prior to 0.7
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Theft
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 +
| Missing check of channel funding UTXO amount
 +
|-
 +
| [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-September/002174.html CVE-2019-13000]
 +
| 2019-08-30
 +
| eclair prior to 0.3
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Theft
 +
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
 +
| Missing check of channel funding UTXO
 
|}
 
|}
  
Line 378: Line 504:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-03-07
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-03-07
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Transaction overwriting
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Transaction overwriting
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 99%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 100%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 414: Line 540:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-04-01
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-04-01
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Mandatory P2SH protocol update
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Mandatory P2SH protocol update
  <b>Deployment:</b> 99%
+
  <b>Deployment:</b> 100%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 430: Line 556:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-05-14
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-05-14
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Block hash collision (via merkle tree)
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Block hash collision (via merkle tree)
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 99%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 100%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 451: Line 577:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-06-20
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-06-20
 
  <b>Summary:</b> (Lack of) orphan txn resource limits
 
  <b>Summary:</b> (Lack of) orphan txn resource limits
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 99%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 100%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 467: Line 593:
 
  <b>Date:</b>  
 
  <b>Date:</b>  
 
  <b>Summary:</b>  
 
  <b>Summary:</b>  
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 98%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 100%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 482: Line 608:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-08-23
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-08-23
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 98%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 100%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 498: Line 624:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-08-24
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-08-24
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 98%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 100%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 513: Line 639:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-01-11
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-01-11
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 99.99%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 529: Line 655:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-01-30
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-01-30
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Predictable change output
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Predictable change output
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 99.99%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 560: Line 686:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-02-14
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-02-14
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Continuous hard disk seek
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Continuous hard disk seek
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 99.99%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 591: Line 717:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-03-11
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-03-11
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 99.99%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 607: Line 733:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-03-25
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-03-25
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Mandatory block protocol update
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Mandatory block protocol update
  <b>Deployment:</b> 99%
+
  <b>Deployment:</b> 100%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 623: Line 749:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-05-15
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-05-15
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
  <b>Deployment:</b> 97%
+
  <b>Deployment:</b> 99.99%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 639: Line 765:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-06-??
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-06-??
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 57%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 99.9%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 654: Line 780:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-07-20
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-07-20
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Timing leak in RPC authentication
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Timing leak in RPC authentication
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 57%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 99.9%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 670: Line 796:
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-09-04
 
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-09-04
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
 
  <b>Summary:</b> Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 61%
+
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 99.9%
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
{| class='wikitable'
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
Line 679: Line 805:
 
=== References ===
 
=== References ===
 
* [https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=287351 Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.4 release notes]
 
* [https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=287351 Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.4 release notes]
 +
 +
== CVE-2016-8889 ==
 +
 +
<b>Date:</b> 2016-10-27
 +
<b>Summary:</b> Debug console history storing sensitive info
 +
<b>Fix Deployment:</b> 100%
 +
{| class='wikitable'
 +
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 +
|-
 +
| Bitcoin Knots GUI || 0.11.0 - 0.13.0 || 0.13.1
 +
|}
 +
 +
=== References ===
 +
* [https://github.com/bitcoinknots/bitcoin/blob/v0.13.1.knots20161027/doc/release-notes.md Bitcoin Knots 0.16.1.knots20161027 release notes]
 +
* [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-8889 US-CERT/NIST]
 +
 +
== CVE-2017-12842 ==
 +
 +
<b>Date:</b> 2018-06-09
 +
<b>Summary:</b> No commitment to block merkle tree depth
 +
 +
=== References ===
 +
* [https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2018/06/09/leaf-node-weakness-in-bitcoin-merkle-tree-design/ Explanation by Sergio Demian Lerner]
 +
* [https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-February/016697.html Further elaboration by Suhas Daftuar]
 +
 +
== CVE-2017-18350 ==
 +
 +
<b>Date:</b> 2019-06-22
 +
<b>Summary:</b> Buffer overflow from SOCKS proxy
 +
{| class='wikitable'
 +
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 +
|-
 +
| Bitcoin-Qt<br>bitcoind || 0.7.0rc1 - 0.15.0 || 0.15.1rc1
 +
|}
 +
 +
=== References ===
 +
* [https://medium.com/@lukedashjr/cve-2017-18350-disclosure-fe6d695f45d5 Disclosure of details]
 +
 +
== CVE-2018-17144 ==
 +
 +
<b>Date:</b> 2018-09-17
 +
<b>Summary:</b> Missing check for duplicate inputs
 +
<b>Fix Deployment:</b> 31%
 +
{| class='wikitable'
 +
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 +
|-
 +
| Bitcoin-Qt<br>bitcoind || 0.14.0rc1 - 0.14.2<br>0.15.0rc1 - 0.15.1<br>0.16.0rc1 - 0.16.2 || 0.14.3<br>0.15.2<br>0.16.3
 +
|}
 +
 +
=== References ===
 +
* [https://bitcoincore.org/en/2018/09/20/notice/ Full disclosure by Bitcoin Core]
 +
* [https://bitcoincore.org/en/2018/09/18/release-0.16.3/ Bitcoin Core 0.16.3 release notes]
 +
* [https://github.com/bitcoinknots/bitcoin/blob/v0.16.3.knots20180918/doc/release-notes.md Bitcoin Knots 0.16.3.knots20180918 release notes]
 +
* [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17144 US-CERT/NIST]
 +
* [https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=666669 Gentoo bug]
 +
 +
== CVE-2018-20586 ==
 +
 +
<b>Date:</b> 2019-06-22
 +
<b>Summary:</b> To Be Disclosed
 +
{| class='wikitable'
 +
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
 +
|-
 +
| Bitcoin-Qt<br>bitcoind || 0.12.0rc1 - 0.17.0 || 0.17.1rc1
 +
|}
  
 
==Definitions==
 
==Definitions==

Latest revision as of 03:22, 12 November 2019

CVE Announced Affects Severity Attack is... Flaw Net
Pre-BIP protocol changes n/a All Bitcoin clients Netsplit[1] Implicit[2] Various hardforks and softforks 100%
CVE-2010-5137 2010-07-28 wxBitcoin and bitcoind DoS[3] Easy OP_LSHIFT crash 100%
CVE-2010-5141 2010-07-28 wxBitcoin and bitcoind Theft[4] Easy OP_RETURN could be used to spend any output. 100%
CVE-2010-5138 2010-07-29 wxBitcoin and bitcoind DoS[3] Easy Unlimited SigOp DoS 100%
CVE-2010-5139 2010-08-15 wxBitcoin and bitcoind Inflation[5] Easy Combined output overflow 100%
CVE-2010-5140 2010-09-29 wxBitcoin and bitcoind DoS[3] Easy Never confirming transactions 100%
CVE-2011-4447 2011-11-11 wxBitcoin and bitcoind Exposure[6] Hard Wallet non-encryption 100%
CVE-2012-1909 2012-03-07 Bitcoin protocol and all clients Netsplit[1] Very hard Transaction overwriting 100%
CVE-2012-1910 2012-03-17 bitcoind & Bitcoin-Qt for Windows Unknown[7] Hard MingW non-multithreading 100%
BIP 0016 2012-04-01 All Bitcoin clients Fake Conf[8] Miners[9] Softfork: P2SH 100%
CVE-2012-2459 2012-05-14 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt Netsplit[1] Easy Block hash collision (via merkle root) 100%
CVE-2012-3789 2012-06-20 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[3] Easy (Lack of) orphan txn resource limits 100%
CVE-2012-4682 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[3] 100%
CVE-2012-4683 2012-08-23 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[3] Easy Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts 100%
CVE-2012-4684 2012-08-24 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[3] Easy Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts 100%
CVE-2013-2272 2013-01-11 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt Exposure[6] Easy Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses 99.99%
CVE-2013-2273 2013-01-30 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt Exposure[6] Easy Predictable change output 99.99%
CVE-2013-2292 2013-01-30 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[3] Hard A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify 0%
CVE-2013-2293 2013-02-14 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[3] Easy Continuous hard disk seek 99.99%
CVE-2013-3219 2013-03-11 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.0 Fake Conf[8] Miners[9] Unenforced block protocol rule 100%
CVE-2013-3220 2013-03-11 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt Netsplit[1] Hard Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions 99.99%
BIP 0034 2013-03-25 All Bitcoin clients Fake Conf[8] Miners[9] Softfork: Height in coinbase 100%
BIP 0050 2013-05-15 All Bitcoin clients Netsplit[1] Implicit[2] Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule 99.99%
CVE-2013-4627 2013-06-?? bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[3] Easy Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data 99.9%
CVE-2013-4165 2013-07-20 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt Theft[10] Local Timing leak in RPC authentication 99.9%
CVE-2013-5700 2013-09-04 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.x DoS[3] Easy Remote p2p crash via bloom filters 99.9%
CVE-2014-0160 2014-04-07 Anything using OpenSSL for TLS Unknown[7] Easy Remote memory leak via payment protocol Unknown
CVE-2015-3641 2014-07-07 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.10.2 DoS[3] Easy (Yet) Unspecified DoS 99.9%
BIP 66 2015-02-13 All Bitcoin clients Fake Conf[8] Miners[9] Softfork: Strict DER signatures 99%
BIP 65 2015-11-12 All Bitcoin clients Fake Conf[8] Miners[9] Softfork: OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY 99%
BIPs 68, 112 & 113 2016-04-11 All Bitcoin clients Fake Conf[8] Miners[9] Softforks: Rel locktime, CSV & MTP locktime 99%
BIPs 141, 143 & 147 2016-10-27 All Bitcoin clients Fake Conf[8] Miners[9] Softfork: Segwit 99%
CVE-2016-8889 2016-10-27 Bitcoin Knots GUI 0.11.0 - 0.13.0 Exposure Hard Debug console history storing sensitive info 100%
CVE-2017-9230  ? Bitcoin  ?  ? ASICBoost 0%
BIP 148 2017-03-12 All Bitcoin clients Fake Conf[8] Miners[9] Softfork: Segwit UASF  ?
CVE-2017-12842 2018-06-09 No commitment to block merkle tree depth
CVE-2016-10724 2018-07-02 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.13.0 DoS[3] Keyholders[11] Alert memory exhaustion 99%
CVE-2016-10725 2018-07-02 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.13.0 DoS[3] Keyholders[11] Final alert cancellation 99%
CVE-2018-17144 2018-09-17 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.16.3 Inflation[5] Miners[9] Missing check for duplicate inputs 62%
CVE-2018-20587 2019-02-08 Bitcoin Knots prior to 0.17.1, and all current Bitcoin Core releases Theft[10] Local No alert for RPC service binding failure 1%
CVE-2017-18350 2019-06-22 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.15.1 Unknown Varies[12] Buffer overflow from SOCKS proxy 89%
CVE-2018-20586 2019-06-22 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to 0.17.1 TBD 50%
CVE-2019-12998 2019-08-30 c-lightning prior to 0.7.1 Theft Easy Missing check of channel funding UTXO
CVE-2019-12999 2019-08-30 lnd prior to 0.7 Theft Easy Missing check of channel funding UTXO amount
CVE-2019-13000 2019-08-30 eclair prior to 0.3 Theft Easy Missing check of channel funding UTXO
  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Attacker can create multiple views of the network, enabling double-spending with over 1 confirmation
  2. 2.0 2.1 This is a protocol "hard-fork" that old clients will reject as invalid and must therefore not be used.
  3. 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 Attacker can disable some functionality, for example by crashing clients
  4. Attacker can take coins outside known network rules
  5. 5.0 5.1 Attacker can create coins outside known network rules
  6. 6.0 6.1 6.2 Attacker can access user data outside known acceptable methods
  7. 7.0 7.1 Extent of possible abuse is unknown
  8. 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation
  9. 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 Attacking requires mining block(s)
  10. 10.0 10.1 Local attacker could potentially determine the RPC passphrase via a timing sidechannel.
  11. 11.0 11.1 Attacking requires signing with the publicly-disclosed alert key
  12. Depends on software configuration


CVE-2010-5137

Date: 2010-07-28
Summary: OP_LSHIFT crash
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin
* - 0.3.4 0.3.5

On July 28 2010, two bugs were discovered and demonstrated on the test network. One caused bitcoin to crash on some machines when processing a transaction containing an OP_LSHIFT. This was never exploited on the main network, and was fixed by Bitcoin version 0.3.5.

After these bugs were discovered, many currently-unused script words were disabled for safety.

References


CVE-2010-5141

Date: 2010-07-28
Summary: ?
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin
* - 0.3.4 0.3.5

On July 28 2010, two bugs were discovered and demonstrated on the test network. One exploited a bug in the transaction handling code and allowed an attacker to spend coins that they did not own. This was never exploited on the main network, and was fixed by Bitcoin version 0.3.5.

After these bugs were discovered, many currently-unused script words were disabled for safety.

References


CVE-2010-5138

Date: 2010-07-29
Summary: Unlimited SigOp DoS
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin
* - 0.3.? 0.3.?

On July 29 2010, it was discovered that block 71036 contained several transactions with a ton of OP_CHECKSIG commands. There should only ever be one such command. This caused every node to do extra unnecessary work, and it could have been used as a denial-of-service attack. A new version of Bitcoin was quickly released. The new version did not cause a fork on the main network, though it did cause one on the test network (where someone had played around with the attack more).

References


CVE-2010-5139

Main article: CVE-2010-5139
Date: 2010-08-15
Summary: Combined output overflow
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin
* - 0.3.10 0.3.11

On August 15 2010, it was discovered that block 74638 contained a transaction that created over 184 billion bitcoins for two different addresses. This was possible because the code used for checking transactions before including them in a block didn't account for the case of outputs so large that they overflowed when summed. A new version was published within a few hours of the discovery. The block chain had to be forked. Although many unpatched nodes continued to build on the "bad" block chain, the "good" block chain overtook it at a block height of 74691. The bad transaction no longer exists for people using the longest chain.

The block and transaction:

CBlock(hash=0000000000790ab3, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=0000000000606865, hashMerkleRoot=618eba,
nTime=1281891957, nBits=1c00800e, nNonce=28192719, vtx=2)
  CTransaction(hash=012cd8, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0)
    CTxIn(COutPoint(000000, -1), coinbase 040e80001c028f00)
    CTxOut(nValue=50.51000000, scriptPubKey=0x4F4BA55D1580F8C3A8A2C7)
  CTransaction(hash=1d5e51, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=2, nLockTime=0)
    CTxIn(COutPoint(237fe8, 0), scriptSig=0xA87C02384E1F184B79C6AC)
    CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0xB7A7)
    CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0x1512)
  vMerkleTree: 012cd8 1d5e51 618eba

Block hash: 0000000000790ab3f22ec756ad43b6ab569abf0bddeb97c67a6f7b1470a7ec1c
Transaction hash: 1d5e512a9723cbef373b970eb52f1e9598ad67e7408077a82fdac194b65333c9

References

CVE-2010-5140

Date: 2010-09-29
Summary: Never confirming transactions
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin
* - 0.3.12 0.3.13

Around September 29, 2010, people started reporting that their sent transactions would not confirm. This happened because people modified Bitcoin to send sub-0.01 transactions without any fees. A 0.01 fee was at that time required by the network for such transactions (essentially prohibiting them), so the transactions remained at 0 confirmations forever. This became a more serious issue because Bitcoin would send transactions using bitcoins gotten from transactions with 0 confirmations, and these resulting transactions would also never confirm. Because Bitcoin tends to prefer sending smaller coins, these invalid transactions quickly multiplied, contaminating the wallets of everyone who received them.

Bitcoin was changed to only select coins with at least 1 confirmation. The remaining sub-0.01 transactions were cleared by generators who modified their version of Bitcoin to not require the micropayment fee. It took a while for everything to get cleared, though, because many of the intermediate transactions had been forgotten by the network by this point and had to be rebroadcast by the original senders.

References


CVE-2011-4447

Date: 2011-11-11
Summary: Wallet non-encryption
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin
0.4.0 - 0.4.1rc6 0.4.1
0.5.0

References


CVE-2012-1909

Date: 2012-03-07
Summary: Transaction overwriting
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin protocol Before March 15th, 2012 BIP 30
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.4rc2
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.4rc2
0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3rc2
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0rc2
0.4.4
0.5.0.4
0.5.3
0.6.0rc3
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

CVE-2012-1910

Date: 2012-03-17
Summary: MingW non-multithreading
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind for Windows
Bitcoin-Qt for Windows
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.4
0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3.0
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0rc3
0.5.0.5
0.5.3.1
0.5.4
0.6.0rc4

References

BIP-0016

Date: 2012-04-01
Summary: Mandatory P2SH protocol update
Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.4
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.5
0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3
0.6.0rc1
0.4.5
0.5.0.6
0.5.4rc1
0.6.0rc2
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

CVE-2012-2459

Date: 2012-05-14
Summary: Block hash collision (via merkle tree)
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.6rc1
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.5rc1
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.7rc1
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.1rc1
0.4.6
0.5.5
0.6.0.7
0.6.1rc2

Block hash collisions can easily be made by duplicating transactions in the merkle tree. Such a collision is invalid, but if recorded (as Bitcoin-Qt and bitcoind prior to 0.6.1 did) would prevent acceptance of the legitimate block with the same hash. This could be used to fork the blockchain, including deep double-spend attacks.

References

CVE-2012-3789

Main article: CVE-2012-3789
Date: 2012-06-20
Summary: (Lack of) orphan txn resource limits
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.7rc2
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2
0.4.7rc3
0.5.6rc3
0.6.0.9rc1
0.6.3rc1

References

CVE-2012-4682

Date: 
Summary: 
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.7rc2
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2
0.4.7rc3
0.5.6rc3
0.6.0.9rc1
0.6.3rc1

References

CVE-2012-4683

Main article: CVE-2012-4683
Date: 2012-08-23
Summary: Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.7rc2
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2
0.7.0

References

CVE-2012-4684

Main article: CVE-2012-4684
Date: 2012-08-24
Summary: Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.7rc2
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2 - 0.6.3rc1
0.7.0

References

CVE-2013-2272

Date: 2013-01-11
Summary: Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
Fix Deployment: 99.99%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.8rc4
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.10rc4
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.4rc4
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.2
0.4.9rc1
0.5.8rc1
0.6.0.11rc1
0.6.5rc1
0.7.3rc1

References

CVE-2013-2273

Date: 2013-01-30
Summary: Predictable change output
Fix Deployment: 99.99%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.8rc4
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.10rc4
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.4rc4
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.2
0.4.9rc1
0.5.8rc1
0.6.0.11rc1
0.6.5rc1
0.7.3rc1

References

CVE-2013-2292

Date: 2013-01-30
Summary: A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify
Fix Deployment: 0%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
All versions No fix yet

References

CVE-2013-2293

Main article: CVE-2013-2293
Date: 2013-02-14
Summary: Continuous hard disk seek
Fix Deployment: 99.99%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.7.3rc1 No fix yet (0.8.0 unaffected)

References

CVE-2013-3219

Date: 2013-03-11
Summary: Unenforced block protocol rule
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.0 0.8.1

References

CVE-2013-3220

Date: 2013-03-11
Summary: Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
Fix Deployment: 99.99%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.9rc1
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc1
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc1
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc1
0.4.9rc2
0.5.8rc2
0.6.5rc2
0.7.3rc2
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

BIP-0034

Date: 2013-03-25
Summary: Mandatory block protocol update
Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.7
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.9
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.3
0.4.8rc1
0.5.7rc1
0.6.0.10rc1
0.6.4rc1
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

BIP-0050

Date: 2013-05-15
Summary: Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
Deployment: 99.99%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.9rc1
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc1
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc1
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc1
0.4.9rc2
0.5.8rc2
0.6.5rc2
0.7.3rc2
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

CVE-2013-4627

Date: 2013-06-??
Summary: Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
Fix Deployment: 99.9%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.9rc3
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc3
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc3
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc3
0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3
0.4.9rc4
0.5.8rc4
0.6.5rc4
0.7.3rc4
0.8.4
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

CVE-2013-4165

Date: 2013-07-20
Summary: Timing leak in RPC authentication
Fix Deployment: 99.9%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
* - 0.4.9rc3
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc3
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc3
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc3
0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3
0.4.9rc4
0.5.8rc4
0.6.5rc4
0.7.3rc4
0.8.4rc1
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

CVE-2013-5700

Date: 2013-09-04
Summary: Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
Fix Deployment: 99.9%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3 0.8.4rc1

References

CVE-2016-8889

Date: 2016-10-27
Summary: Debug console history storing sensitive info
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin Knots GUI 0.11.0 - 0.13.0 0.13.1

References

CVE-2017-12842

Date: 2018-06-09
Summary: No commitment to block merkle tree depth

References

CVE-2017-18350

Date: 2019-06-22
Summary: Buffer overflow from SOCKS proxy
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
0.7.0rc1 - 0.15.0 0.15.1rc1

References

CVE-2018-17144

Date: 2018-09-17
Summary: Missing check for duplicate inputs
Fix Deployment: 31%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
0.14.0rc1 - 0.14.2
0.15.0rc1 - 0.15.1
0.16.0rc1 - 0.16.2
0.14.3
0.15.2
0.16.3

References

CVE-2018-20586

Date: 2019-06-22
Summary: To Be Disclosed
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind
0.12.0rc1 - 0.17.0 0.17.1rc1

Definitions

A critical vulnerability is one that will have disastrous consequences if it is exploited. A serious vulnerability is one that will have serious consequences if it is exploited[1].

See Also

References