Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 14:19, 20 September 2014

CVE	Announced	Affects	Severity	Attack is...	Flaw	Net
CVE-2010-5137	2010-07-28	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	DoS^[1]	Easy	OP_LSHIFT crash	100%
CVE-2010-5141	2010-07-28	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	Theft^[2]	Easy		100%
CVE-2010-5138	2010-07-29	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	DoS^[1]	Easy	Unlimited SigOp DoS	100%
CVE-2010-5139	2010-08-15	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	Theft^[2]	Easy	Combined output overflow	100%
CVE-2010-5140	2010-09-29	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	DoS^[1]	Easy	Never confirming transactions	100%
CVE-2011-4447	2011-11-11	wxBitcoin and bitcoind	Exposure^[3]	Hard	Wallet non-encryption	100%
CVE-2012-1909	2012-03-07	Bitcoin protocol and all clients	Netsplit^[4]	Very hard	Transaction overwriting	99%
CVE-2012-1910	2012-03-17	bitcoind & Bitcoin-Qt for Windows	Unknown^[5]	Hard	MingW non-multithreading	100%
BIP 0016	2012-04-01	All Bitcoin clients	Fake Conf^[6]	Miners^[7]	Mandatory P2SH protocol update	99%
CVE-2012-2459	2012-05-14	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	Netsplit^[4]	Easy	Block hash collision (via merkle root)	99%
CVE-2012-3789	2012-06-20	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS^[1]	Easy	(Lack of) orphan txn resource limits	99%
CVE-2012-4682		bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS^[1]			98%
CVE-2012-4683	2012-08-23	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS^[1]	Easy	Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts	98%
CVE-2012-4684	2012-08-24	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS^[1]	Easy	Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts	98%
CVE-2013-2272	2013-01-11	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	Exposure^[3]	Easy	Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses	97%
CVE-2013-2273	2013-01-30	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	Exposure^[3]	Easy	Predictable change output	97%
CVE-2013-2292	2013-01-30	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS^[1]	Hard	A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify	0%
CVE-2013-2293	2013-02-14	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS^[1]	Easy	Continuous hard disk seek	97%
CVE-2013-3219	2013-03-11	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.0	Fake Conf^[6]	Miners^[7]	Unenforced block protocol rule	100%
CVE-2013-3220	2013-03-11	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	Netsplit^[4]	Hard	Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions	97%
BIP 0034	2013-03-25	All Bitcoin clients	Fake Conf^[6]	Miners^[7]	Mandatory block protocol update	99%
BIP 0050	2013-05-15	All Bitcoin clients	Netsplit^[4]	Implicit^[8]	Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule	97%
CVE-2013-4627	2013-06-??	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	DoS^[1]	Easy	Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data	57%
CVE-2013-4165	2013-07-20	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt	Theft^[2]	Local	Timing leak in RPC authentication	57%
CVE-2013-5700	2013-09-04	bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.x	DoS^[1]	Easy	Remote p2p crash via bloom filters	61%
CVE-2014-0160	2014-04-07	Anything using OpenSSL for TLS	Unknown^[5]	Easy	Remote memory leak via payment protocol	Unknown

↑ ^1.00 ^1.01 ^1.02 ^1.03 ^1.04 ^1.05 ^1.06 ^1.07 ^1.08 ^1.09 ^1.10 Attacker can disable some functionality, for example by crashing clients
↑ ^2.0 ^2.1 ^2.2 Attacker can take or create money outside known network rules
↑ ^3.0 ^3.1 ^3.2 Attacker can access user data outside known acceptable methods
↑ ^4.0 ^4.1 ^4.2 ^4.3 Attacker can create multiple views of the network, enabling double-spending with over 1 confirmation
↑ ^5.0 ^5.1 Extent of possible abuse is unknown
↑ ^6.0 ^6.1 ^6.2 Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation
↑ ^7.0 ^7.1 ^7.2 Attacking requires mining block(s)
↑ This is a protocol "hard-fork" that old clients will reject as invalid and must therefore not be used.

CVE-2010-5137

Date: 2010-07-28
Summary: OP_LSHIFT crash
Fix Deployment: 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	* - 0.3.4	0.3.5

On July 28 2010, two bugs were discovered and demonstrated on the test network. One caused bitcoin to crash on some machines when processing a transaction containing an OP_LSHIFT. This was never exploited on the main network, and was fixed by Bitcoin version 0.3.5.

After these bugs were discovered, many currently-unused script words were disabled for safety.

References

US-CERT/NIST

CVE-2010-5141

Date: 2010-07-28
Summary: ?
Fix Deployment: 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	* - 0.3.4	0.3.5

On July 28 2010, two bugs were discovered and demonstrated on the test network. One exploited a bug in the transaction handling code and allowed an attacker to spend coins that they did not own. This was never exploited on the main network, and was fixed by Bitcoin version 0.3.5.

After these bugs were discovered, many currently-unused script words were disabled for safety.

References

US-CERT/NIST

CVE-2010-5138

Date: 2010-07-29
Summary: Unlimited SigOp DoS
Fix Deployment: 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	* - 0.3.?	0.3.?

On July 29 2010, it was discovered that block 71036 contained several transactions with a ton of OP_CHECKSIG commands. There should only ever be one such command. This caused every node to do extra unnecessary work, and it could have been used as a denial-of-service attack. A new version of Bitcoin was quickly released. The new version did not cause a fork on the main network, though it did cause one on the test network (where someone had played around with the attack more).

References

US-CERT/NIST

CVE-2010-5139

Main article: CVE-2010-5139

Date: 2010-08-15
Summary: Combined output overflow
Fix Deployment: 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	* - 0.3.10	0.3.11

On August 15 2010, it was discovered that block 74638 contained a transaction that created over 184 billion bitcoins for two different addresses. This was possible because the code used for checking transactions before including them in a block didn't account for the case of outputs so large that they overflowed when summed. A new version was published within a few hours of the discovery. The block chain had to be forked. Although many unpatched nodes continued to build on the "bad" block chain, the "good" block chain overtook it at a block height of 74691. The bad transaction no longer exists for people using the longest chain.

The block and transaction:

CBlock(hash=0000000000790ab3, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=0000000000606865, hashMerkleRoot=618eba,
nTime=1281891957, nBits=1c00800e, nNonce=28192719, vtx=2)
  CTransaction(hash=012cd8, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0)
    CTxIn(COutPoint(000000, -1), coinbase 040e80001c028f00)
    CTxOut(nValue=50.51000000, scriptPubKey=0x4F4BA55D1580F8C3A8A2C7)
  CTransaction(hash=1d5e51, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=2, nLockTime=0)
    CTxIn(COutPoint(237fe8, 0), scriptSig=0xA87C02384E1F184B79C6AC)
    CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0xB7A7)
    CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0x1512)
  vMerkleTree: 012cd8 1d5e51 618eba

Block hash: 0000000000790ab3f22ec756ad43b6ab569abf0bddeb97c67a6f7b1470a7ec1c
Transaction hash: 1d5e512a9723cbef373b970eb52f1e9598ad67e7408077a82fdac194b65333c9

References

CVE-2010-5140

Date: 2010-09-29
Summary: Never confirming transactions
Fix Deployment: 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	* - 0.3.12	0.3.13

Around September 29, 2010, people started reporting that their sent transactions would not confirm. This happened because people modified Bitcoin to send sub-0.01 transactions without any fees. A 0.01 fee was at that time required by the network for such transactions (essentially prohibiting them), so the transactions remained at 0 confirmations forever. This became a more serious issue because Bitcoin would send transactions using bitcoins gotten from transactions with 0 confirmations, and these resulting transactions would also never confirm. Because Bitcoin tends to prefer sending smaller coins, these invalid transactions quickly multiplied, contaminating the wallets of everyone who received them.

Bitcoin was changed to only select coins with at least 1 confirmation. The remaining sub-0.01 transactions were cleared by generators who modified their version of Bitcoin to not require the micropayment fee. It took a while for everything to get cleared, though, because many of the intermediate transactions had been forgotten by the network by this point and had to be rebroadcast by the original senders.

References

CVE-2011-4447

Date: 2011-11-11
Summary: Wallet non-encryption
Fix Deployment: 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind wxBitcoin	0.4.0 - 0.4.1rc6	0.4.1 0.5.0

References

CVE-2012-1909

Date: 2012-03-07
Summary: Transaction overwriting
Fix Deployment: 99%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin protocol	Before March 15th, 2012	BIP 30
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.4rc2 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.4rc2 0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3rc2 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0rc2	0.4.4 0.5.0.4 0.5.3 0.6.0rc3
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

CVE-2012-1910

Date: 2012-03-17
Summary: MingW non-multithreading
Fix Deployment: 100%

Affected		Fix
bitcoind for Windows Bitcoin-Qt for Windows	0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.4 0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3.0 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0rc3	0.5.0.5 0.5.3.1 0.5.4 0.6.0rc4

References

BIP-0016

Date: 2012-04-01
Summary: Mandatory P2SH protocol update
Deployment: 99%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.4 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.5 0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3 0.6.0rc1	0.4.5 0.5.0.6 0.5.4rc1 0.6.0rc2
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

BIP 0016

CVE-2012-2459

Date: 2012-05-14
Summary: Block hash collision (via merkle tree)
Fix Deployment: 99%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.6rc1 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.5rc1 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.7rc1 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.1rc1	0.4.6 0.5.5 0.6.0.7 0.6.1rc2

Block hash collisions can easily be made by duplicating transactions in the merkle tree. Such a collision is invalid, but if recorded (as Bitcoin-Qt and bitcoind prior to 0.6.1 did) would prevent acceptance of the legitimate block with the same hash. This could be used to fork the blockchain, including deep double-spend attacks.

References

CVE-2012-3789

Date: 2012-06-20
Summary: (Lack of) orphan txn resource limits
Fix Deployment: 99%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.7rc2 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2	0.4.7rc3 0.5.6rc3 0.6.0.9rc1 0.6.3rc1

References

CVE-2012-4682

Date: 
Summary: 
Fix Deployment: 98%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.7rc2 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2	0.4.7rc3 0.5.6rc3 0.6.0.9rc1 0.6.3rc1

References

CVE-2012-4683

Date: 2012-08-23
Summary: Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
Fix Deployment: 98%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.7rc2 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2	0.7.0

References

CVE-2012-4684

Date: 2012-08-24
Summary: Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
Fix Deployment: 98%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.7rc2 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2 - 0.6.3rc1	0.7.0

References

CVE-2013-2272

Date: 2013-01-11
Summary: Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
Fix Deployment: 97%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.8rc4 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.10rc4 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.4rc4 0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.2	0.4.9rc1 0.5.8rc1 0.6.0.11rc1 0.6.5rc1 0.7.3rc1

References

CVE-2013-2273

Date: 2013-01-30
Summary: Predictable change output
Fix Deployment: 97%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.8rc4 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.10rc4 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.4rc4 0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.2	0.4.9rc1 0.5.8rc1 0.6.0.11rc1 0.6.5rc1 0.7.3rc1

References

Gentoo bug

CVE-2013-2292

Date: 2013-01-30
Summary: A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify
Fix Deployment: 0%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	All versions	No fix yet

References

CVE-2013-2293

Date: 2013-02-14
Summary: Continuous hard disk seek
Fix Deployment: 97%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.7.3rc1	No fix yet (0.8.0 unaffected)

References

CVE-2013-3219

Date: 2013-03-11
Summary: Unenforced block protocol rule
Fix Deployment: 100%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.0	0.8.1

References

BIP 50

CVE-2013-3220

Date: 2013-03-11
Summary: Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
Fix Deployment: 97%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.9rc1 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc1 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc1 0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc1	0.4.9rc2 0.5.8rc2 0.6.5rc2 0.7.3rc2
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

BIP 50

BIP-0034

Date: 2013-03-25
Summary: Mandatory block protocol update
Deployment: 99%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.7 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.9 0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.3	0.4.8rc1 0.5.7rc1 0.6.0.10rc1 0.6.4rc1
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

BIP 0034

BIP-0050

Date: 2013-05-15
Summary: Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
Deployment: 97%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.9rc1 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc1 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc1 0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc1	0.4.9rc2 0.5.8rc2 0.6.5rc2 0.7.3rc2
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

BIP 0050

CVE-2013-4627

Date: 2013-06-??
Summary: Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
Fix Deployment: 57%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.9rc3 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc3 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc3 0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc3 0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3	0.4.9rc4 0.5.8rc4 0.6.5rc4 0.7.3rc4 0.8.4
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

CVE-2013-4165

Date: 2013-07-20
Summary: Timing leak in RPC authentication
Fix Deployment: 57%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	* - 0.4.9rc3 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc3 0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc3 0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc3 0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3	0.4.9rc4 0.5.8rc4 0.6.5rc4 0.7.3rc4 0.8.4rc1
wxBitcoin	ALL	NONE

References

Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.4 release notes

CVE-2013-5700

Date: 2013-09-04
Summary: Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
Fix Deployment: 61%

Affected		Fix
Bitcoin-Qt bitcoind	0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3	0.8.4rc1

References

Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.4 release notes

Definitions

A critical vulnerability is one that will have disastrous consequences if it is exploited. A serious vulnerability is one that will have serious consequences if it is exploited^[1].

References

↑ http://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=88892.0

[DoS-1] 1.00 ^1.01 ^1.02 ^1.03 ^1.04 ^1.05 ^1.06 ^1.07 ^1.08 ^1.09 ^1.10 Attacker can disable some functionality, for example by crashing clients

[Theft-2] 2.0 ^2.1 ^2.2 Attacker can take or create money outside known network rules

[Exposure-3] 3.0 ^3.1 ^3.2 Attacker can access user data outside known acceptable methods

[Netsplit-4] 4.0 ^4.1 ^4.2 ^4.3 Attacker can create multiple views of the network, enabling double-spending with over 1 confirmation

[Unknown-5] 5.0 ^5.1 Extent of possible abuse is unknown

[FakeConf-6] 6.0 ^6.1 ^6.2 Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation

[MinerEasy-7] 7.0 ^7.1 ^7.2 Attacking requires mining block(s)

[hardfork-8] This is a protocol "hard-fork" that old clients will reject as invalid and must therefore not be used.

[9] ttp://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=88892.0

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[1]

@@ Line 282: / Line 282: @@
 == CVE-2010-5139 ==
+{{main|CVE-2010-5139}}
   <b>Date:</b> 2010-08-15
   <b>Summary:</b> Combined output overflow
@@ Line 312: / Line 312: @@
 * [https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=822.0 Discovery]
 * [http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-5139 US-CERT/NIST]
 == CVE-2010-5140 ==

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 14:19, 20 September 2014

CVE-2010-5137

References

CVE-2010-5141

References

CVE-2010-5138

References

CVE-2010-5139

References

CVE-2010-5140

References

CVE-2011-4447

References

CVE-2012-1909

References

CVE-2012-1910

References

BIP-0016

References

CVE-2012-2459

References

CVE-2012-3789

References

CVE-2012-4682

References

CVE-2012-4683

References

CVE-2012-4684

References

CVE-2013-2272

References

CVE-2013-2273

References

CVE-2013-2292

References

CVE-2013-2293

References

CVE-2013-3219

References

CVE-2013-3220

References

BIP-0034

References

BIP-0050

References

CVE-2013-4627

References

CVE-2013-4165

References

CVE-2013-5700

References

Definitions

See Also

References

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