Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: Difference between revisions

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Clerks, Administrators, Editors
3,074 edits
m Update fix deployment %s
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|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4682.html 97%]
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4682.html 98%]
|-
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| [[#CVE-2012-4683|CVE-2012-4683]]
| [[#CVE-2012-4683|CVE-2012-4683]]
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| bgcolor=pink| Easy
| bgcolor=pink| Easy
| Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
| Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4683.html 97%]
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/CVE-2012-4683.html 98%]
|-
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| [[#CVE-2012-4684|CVE-2012-4684]]
| [[#CVE-2012-4684|CVE-2012-4684]]
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| bgcolor=pink| Easy
| bgcolor=pink| Easy
| Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
| Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20124684 97%]
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20124684 98%]
|-
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| [[#CVE-2013-2272|CVE-2013-2272]]
| [[#CVE-2013-2272|CVE-2013-2272]]
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|bgcolor=pink| Easy
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
| Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
| Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
|bgcolor=yellow| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132272 93%]
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132272 97%]
|-
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| [[#CVE-2013-2273|CVE-2013-2273]]
| [[#CVE-2013-2273|CVE-2013-2273]]
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|bgcolor=yellow| Easy
|bgcolor=yellow| Easy
| Predictable change output
| Predictable change output
|bgcolor=yellow| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132273 93%]
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132273 97%]
|-
|-
| [[#CVE-2013-2292|CVE-2013-2292]]
| [[#CVE-2013-2292|CVE-2013-2292]]
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|bgcolor=lime| Hard
|bgcolor=lime| Hard
| A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify
| A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132292 -]
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132292 0%]
|-
|-
| [[#CVE-2013-2293|CVE-2013-2293]]
| [[#CVE-2013-2293|CVE-2013-2293]]
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|bgcolor=pink| Easy
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
| Continuous hard disk seek
| Continuous hard disk seek
|bgcolor=yellow| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132293 93%]
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20132293 97%]
|-
|-
| [[#CVE-2013-3219|CVE-2013-3219]]
| [[#CVE-2013-3219|CVE-2013-3219]]
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|bgcolor=lime| Hard
|bgcolor=lime| Hard
| Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
| Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
|bgcolor=yellow| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20133220 94%]
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20133220 97%]
|-
|-
| [[#BIP-0034|BIP 0034]]
| [[#BIP-0034|BIP 0034]]
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|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
|bgcolor=yellow| Miners<ref name="MinerEasy">Attacking requires mining block(s)</ref>
| Mandatory block protocol update
| Mandatory block protocol update
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/BIP-0034.html 97%]
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/BIP-0034.html 99%]
|-
|-
| [[#BIP-0050|BIP 0050]]
| [[#BIP-0050|BIP 0050]]
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|bgcolor=pink| Implicit<ref name="hardfork">This is a protocol "hard-fork" that old clients will reject as invalid and must therefore not be used.</ref>
|bgcolor=pink| Implicit<ref name="hardfork">This is a protocol "hard-fork" that old clients will reject as invalid and must therefore not be used.</ref>
| Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
| Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
|bgcolor=yellow| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?50 93%]
|bgcolor=lime| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?50 97%]
|-
|-
| [[#CVE-2013-4627|CVE-2013-4627]]
| [[#CVE-2013-4627|CVE-2013-4627]]
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|bgcolor=yellow| Easy
|bgcolor=yellow| Easy
| Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
| Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20134627 2%]
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20134627 57%]
|-
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| [[#CVE-2013-4165|CVE-2013-4165]]
| [[#CVE-2013-4165|CVE-2013-4165]]
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|bgcolor=lime| Local
|bgcolor=lime| Local
| Timing leak in RPC authentication
| Timing leak in RPC authentication
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20134165 2%]
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20134165 57%]
|-
|-
| [[#CVE-2013-5700|CVE-2013-5700]]
| [[#CVE-2013-5700|CVE-2013-5700]]
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|bgcolor=pink| Easy
|bgcolor=pink| Easy
| Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
| Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20135700 9%]
|bgcolor=pink| [http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/security.html?20135700 61%]
|-
|-
| [[#CVE-2014-0160|CVE-2014-0160]]
| [[#CVE-2014-0160|CVE-2014-0160]]
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  <b>Date:</b>  
  <b>Date:</b>  
  <b>Summary:</b>  
  <b>Summary:</b>  
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 98%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2012-08-23
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-08-23
  <b>Summary:</b> Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
  <b>Summary:</b> Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 98%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2012-08-24
  <b>Date:</b> 2012-08-24
  <b>Summary:</b> Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
  <b>Summary:</b> Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 98%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2013-01-11
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-01-11
  <b>Summary:</b> Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
  <b>Summary:</b> Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 93%
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2013-01-30
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-01-30
  <b>Summary:</b> Predictable change output
  <b>Summary:</b> Predictable change output
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 93%
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2013-01-30
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-01-30
  <b>Summary:</b> A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify
  <b>Summary:</b> A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> -
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 0%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2013-02-14
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-02-14
  <b>Summary:</b> Continuous hard disk seek
  <b>Summary:</b> Continuous hard disk seek
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 93%
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2013-03-11
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-03-11
  <b>Summary:</b> Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
  <b>Summary:</b> Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 94%
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 97%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2013-03-25
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-03-25
  <b>Summary:</b> Mandatory block protocol update
  <b>Summary:</b> Mandatory block protocol update
  <b>Deployment:</b> 97%
  <b>Deployment:</b> 99%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2013-05-15
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-05-15
  <b>Summary:</b> Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
  <b>Summary:</b> Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
  <b>Deployment:</b> 93%
  <b>Deployment:</b> 97%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2013-06-??
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-06-??
  <b>Summary:</b> Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
  <b>Summary:</b> Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 2%
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 57%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2013-07-20
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-07-20
  <b>Summary:</b> Timing leak in RPC authentication
  <b>Summary:</b> Timing leak in RPC authentication
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 2%
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 57%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
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  <b>Date:</b> 2013-09-04
  <b>Date:</b> 2013-09-04
  <b>Summary:</b> Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
  <b>Summary:</b> Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 9%
  <b>Fix Deployment:</b> 61%
{| class='wikitable'
{| class='wikitable'
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix
!colspan='2'| Affected !! Fix

Revision as of 16:25, 19 April 2014

CVE Announced Affects Severity Attack is... Flaw Net
CVE-2010-5137 2010-07-28 wxBitcoin and bitcoind DoS[1] Easy OP_LSHIFT crash 100%
CVE-2010-5141 2010-07-28 wxBitcoin and bitcoind Theft[2] Easy 100%
CVE-2010-5138 2010-07-29 wxBitcoin and bitcoind DoS[1] Easy Unlimited SigOp DoS 100%
CVE-2010-5139 2010-08-15 wxBitcoin and bitcoind Theft[2] Easy Combined output overflow 100%
CVE-2010-5140 2010-09-29 wxBitcoin and bitcoind DoS[1] Easy Never confirming transactions 100%
CVE-2011-4447 2011-11-11 wxBitcoin and bitcoind Exposure[3] Hard Wallet non-encryption 100%
CVE-2012-1909 2012-03-07 Bitcoin protocol and all clients Netsplit[4] Very hard Transaction overwriting 99%
CVE-2012-1910 2012-03-17 bitcoind & Bitcoin-Qt for Windows Unknown[5] Hard MingW non-multithreading 100%
BIP 0016 2012-04-01 All Bitcoin clients Fake Conf[6] Miners[7] Mandatory P2SH protocol update 99%
CVE-2012-2459 2012-05-14 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt Netsplit[4] Easy Block hash collision (via merkle root) 99%
CVE-2012-3789 2012-06-20 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[1] Easy (Lack of) orphan txn resource limits 99%
CVE-2012-4682 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[1] 98%
CVE-2012-4683 2012-08-23 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[1] Easy Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts 98%
CVE-2012-4684 2012-08-24 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[1] Easy Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts 98%
CVE-2013-2272 2013-01-11 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt Exposure[3] Easy Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses 97%
CVE-2013-2273 2013-01-30 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt Exposure[3] Easy Predictable change output 97%
CVE-2013-2292 2013-01-30 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[1] Hard A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify 0%
CVE-2013-2293 2013-02-14 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[1] Easy Continuous hard disk seek 97%
CVE-2013-3219 2013-03-11 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.0 Fake Conf[6] Miners[7] Unenforced block protocol rule 100%
CVE-2013-3220 2013-03-11 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt Netsplit[4] Hard Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions 97%
BIP 0034 2013-03-25 All Bitcoin clients Fake Conf[6] Miners[7] Mandatory block protocol update 99%
BIP 0050 2013-05-15 All Bitcoin clients Netsplit[4] Implicit[8] Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule 97%
CVE-2013-4627 2013-06-?? bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt DoS[1] Easy Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data 57%
CVE-2013-4165 2013-07-20 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt Theft[2] Local Timing leak in RPC authentication 57%
CVE-2013-5700 2013-09-04 bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.x DoS[1] Easy Remote p2p crash via bloom filters 61%
CVE-2014-0160 2014-04-07 Anything using OpenSSL for TLS Unknown[5] Easy Remote memory leak via payment protocol Unknown
  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 Attacker can disable some functionality, for example by crashing clients
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Attacker can take or create money outside known network rules
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Attacker can access user data outside known acceptable methods
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Attacker can create multiple views of the network, enabling double-spending with over 1 confirmation
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Extent of possible abuse is unknown
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Attacker can double-spend with 1 confirmation
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Attacking requires mining block(s)
  8. ↑ This is a protocol "hard-fork" that old clients will reject as invalid and must therefore not be used.


CVE-2010-5137

Date: 2010-07-28
Summary: OP_LSHIFT crash
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin		 * - 0.3.4 0.3.5

On July 28 2010, two bugs were discovered and demonstrated on the test network. One caused bitcoin to crash on some machines when processing a transaction containing an OP_LSHIFT. This was never exploited on the main network, and was fixed by Bitcoin version 0.3.5.

After these bugs were discovered, many currently-unused script words were disabled for safety.

References


CVE-2010-5141

Date: 2010-07-28
Summary: ?
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin		 * - 0.3.4 0.3.5

On July 28 2010, two bugs were discovered and demonstrated on the test network. One exploited a bug in the transaction handling code and allowed an attacker to spend coins that they did not own. This was never exploited on the main network, and was fixed by Bitcoin version 0.3.5.

After these bugs were discovered, many currently-unused script words were disabled for safety.

References


CVE-2010-5138

Date: 2010-07-29
Summary: Unlimited SigOp DoS
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin		 * - 0.3.? 0.3.?

On July 29 2010, it was discovered that block 71036 contained several transactions with a ton of OP_CHECKSIG commands. There should only ever be one such command. This caused every node to do extra unnecessary work, and it could have been used as a denial-of-service attack. A new version of Bitcoin was quickly released. The new version did not cause a fork on the main network, though it did cause one on the test network (where someone had played around with the attack more).

References


CVE-2010-5139

Date: 2010-08-15
Summary: Combined output overflow
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin		 * - 0.3.10 0.3.11

On August 15 2010, it was discovered that block 74638 contained a transaction that created over 184 billion bitcoins for two different addresses. This was possible because the code used for checking transactions before including them in a block didn't account for the case of outputs so large that they overflowed when summed. A new version was published within a few hours of the discovery. The block chain had to be forked. Although many unpatched nodes continued to build on the "bad" block chain, the "good" block chain overtook it at a block height of 74691. The bad transaction no longer exists for people using the longest chain.

The block and transaction: 

CBlock(hash=0000000000790ab3, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=0000000000606865, hashMerkleRoot=618eba,
nTime=1281891957, nBits=1c00800e, nNonce=28192719, vtx=2)
  CTransaction(hash=012cd8, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0)
    CTxIn(COutPoint(000000, -1), coinbase 040e80001c028f00)
    CTxOut(nValue=50.51000000, scriptPubKey=0x4F4BA55D1580F8C3A8A2C7)
  CTransaction(hash=1d5e51, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=2, nLockTime=0)
    CTxIn(COutPoint(237fe8, 0), scriptSig=0xA87C02384E1F184B79C6AC)
    CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0xB7A7)
    CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0x1512)
  vMerkleTree: 012cd8 1d5e51 618eba

Block hash: 0000000000790ab3f22ec756ad43b6ab569abf0bddeb97c67a6f7b1470a7ec1c
Transaction hash: 1d5e512a9723cbef373b970eb52f1e9598ad67e7408077a82fdac194b65333c9

References


CVE-2010-5140

Date: 2010-09-29
Summary: Never confirming transactions
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin		 * - 0.3.12 0.3.13

Around September 29, 2010, people started reporting that their sent transactions would not confirm. This happened because people modified Bitcoin to send sub-0.01 transactions without any fees. A 0.01 fee was at that time required by the network for such transactions (essentially prohibiting them), so the transactions remained at 0 confirmations forever. This became a more serious issue because Bitcoin would send transactions using bitcoins gotten from transactions with 0 confirmations, and these resulting transactions would also never confirm. Because Bitcoin tends to prefer sending smaller coins, these invalid transactions quickly multiplied, contaminating the wallets of everyone who received them.

Bitcoin was changed to only select coins with at least 1 confirmation. The remaining sub-0.01 transactions were cleared by generators who modified their version of Bitcoin to not require the micropayment fee. It took a while for everything to get cleared, though, because many of the intermediate transactions had been forgotten by the network by this point and had to be rebroadcast by the original senders.

References


CVE-2011-4447

Date: 2011-11-11
Summary: Wallet non-encryption
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind
wxBitcoin		 0.4.0 - 0.4.1rc6 0.4.1
0.5.0

References


CVE-2012-1909

Date: 2012-03-07
Summary: Transaction overwriting
Fix Deployment: 99%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin protocol Before March 15th, 2012 BIP 30
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.4rc2
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.4rc2
0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3rc2
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0rc2		 0.4.4
0.5.0.4
0.5.3
0.6.0rc3
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

CVE-2012-1910

Date: 2012-03-17
Summary: MingW non-multithreading
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
bitcoind for Windows
Bitcoin-Qt for Windows		 0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.4
0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3.0
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0rc3		 0.5.0.5
0.5.3.1
0.5.4
0.6.0rc4

References

BIP-0016

Date: 2012-04-01
Summary: Mandatory P2SH protocol update
Deployment: 99%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.4
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.0.5
0.5.1rc1 - 0.5.3
0.6.0rc1		 0.4.5
0.5.0.6
0.5.4rc1
0.6.0rc2
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

CVE-2012-2459

Date: 2012-05-14
Summary: Block hash collision (via merkle tree)
Fix Deployment: 99%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.6rc1
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.5rc1
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.7rc1
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.1rc1		 0.4.6
0.5.5
0.6.0.7
0.6.1rc2

Block hash collisions can easily be made by duplicating transactions in the merkle tree. Such a collision is invalid, but if recorded (as Bitcoin-Qt and bitcoind prior to 0.6.1 did) would prevent acceptance of the legitimate block with the same hash. This could be used to fork the blockchain, including deep double-spend attacks.

References

CVE-2012-3789

Date: 2012-06-20
Summary: (Lack of) orphan txn resource limits
Fix Deployment: 99%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.7rc2
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2		 0.4.7rc3
0.5.6rc3
0.6.0.9rc1
0.6.3rc1

References

CVE-2012-4682

Date: 
Summary: 
Fix Deployment: 98%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.7rc2
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2		 0.4.7rc3
0.5.6rc3
0.6.0.9rc1
0.6.3rc1

References

CVE-2012-4683

Date: 2012-08-23
Summary: Targeted DoS by CPU exhaustion using alerts
Fix Deployment: 98%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.7rc2
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2		 0.7.0

References

CVE-2012-4684

Date: 2012-08-24
Summary: Network-wide DoS using malleable signatures in alerts
Fix Deployment: 98%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.7rc2
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.6rc2
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.8rc2
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.2.2 - 0.6.3rc1		 0.7.0

References

CVE-2013-2272

Date: 2013-01-11
Summary: Remote discovery of node's wallet addresses
Fix Deployment: 97%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.8rc4
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.10rc4
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.4rc4
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.2		 0.4.9rc1
0.5.8rc1
0.6.0.11rc1
0.6.5rc1
0.7.3rc1

References

CVE-2013-2273

Date: 2013-01-30
Summary: Predictable change output
Fix Deployment: 97%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.8rc4
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.10rc4
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.4rc4
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.2		 0.4.9rc1
0.5.8rc1
0.6.0.11rc1
0.6.5rc1
0.7.3rc1

References

CVE-2013-2292

Date: 2013-01-30
Summary: A transaction that takes at least 3 minutes to verify
Fix Deployment: 0%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 All versions No fix yet

References

CVE-2013-2293

Date: 2013-02-14
Summary: Continuous hard disk seek
Fix Deployment: 97%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.7.3rc1 No fix yet (0.8.0 unaffected)

References

CVE-2013-3219

Date: 2013-03-11
Summary: Unenforced block protocol rule
Fix Deployment: 100%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.0 0.8.1

References

CVE-2013-3220

Date: 2013-03-11
Summary: Inconsistent BDB lock limit interactions
Fix Deployment: 97%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.9rc1
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc1
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc1
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc1		 0.4.9rc2
0.5.8rc2
0.6.5rc2
0.7.3rc2
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

BIP-0034

Date: 2013-03-25
Summary: Mandatory block protocol update
Deployment: 99%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.7
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.7
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.0.9
0.6.1rc1 - 0.6.3		 0.4.8rc1
0.5.7rc1
0.6.0.10rc1
0.6.4rc1
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

BIP-0050

Date: 2013-05-15
Summary: Hard fork to remove txid limit protocol rule
Deployment: 97%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.9rc1
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc1
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc1
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc1		 0.4.9rc2
0.5.8rc2
0.6.5rc2
0.7.3rc2
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

CVE-2013-4627

Date: 2013-06-??
Summary: Memory exhaustion with excess tx message data
Fix Deployment: 57%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.9rc3
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc3
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc3
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc3
0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3		 0.4.9rc4
0.5.8rc4
0.6.5rc4
0.7.3rc4
0.8.4
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

CVE-2013-4165

Date: 2013-07-20
Summary: Timing leak in RPC authentication
Fix Deployment: 57%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 * - 0.4.9rc3
0.5.0rc1 - 0.5.8rc3
0.6.0rc1 - 0.6.5rc3
0.7.0rc1 - 0.7.3rc3
0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3		 0.4.9rc4
0.5.8rc4
0.6.5rc4
0.7.3rc4
0.8.4rc1
wxBitcoin ALL NONE

References

CVE-2013-5700

Date: 2013-09-04
Summary: Remote p2p crash via bloom filters
Fix Deployment: 61%
Affected Fix
Bitcoin-Qt
bitcoind		 0.8.0rc1 - 0.8.3 0.8.4rc1

References

Definitions

A critical vulnerability is one that will have disastrous consequences if it is exploited. A serious vulnerability is one that will have serious consequences if it is exploited[1].

See Also

References

  1. ↑ http://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=88892.0
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