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| = Malicious forking = | | == Adaptive Difficulty == |
| | Deleted old discussion and am including link to page that summarizes Ian Stewart's ideas:[[Adaptive_difficulty|adaptive difficulty]] |
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| Surely proof-of-stake is vulnerable to malicious forking of the blockchain, whether motivated by double spending or just sowing destructive confusion of multiple versions?
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| Each version of the blockchain is a full, self-contained "version of reality". If you (the malicious party engineering a fork) burn through your "stake" - whether bitcoins owned, bitcoin days destroyed, or anything similar - on one version of the blockchain, that still doesn't stop you creating another version, starting from the same block-before-yours as you started from for your first effort, where your same "stake" still exists and hasn't been burned through. (And then another, and another... All forking from the blockchain-as-was (just before you started your malicious antics), which records your untouched stake.) So with trivial computational effort, you can create huge multiple forks; and there's no easy way for the network to pick a winner.
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| Proof-of-work doesn't suffer from this problem. A malicious party trying the above trick would have to perform fresh work for each fork, since the work done in finding a difficulty-satisfying hash on one fork has no transferable value to the task of finding one on the other fork(s).
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| Am I missing something? [[User:Ids|Iain Stewart]] 23:24, 24 March 2012 (GMT)
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Latest revision as of 02:23, 23 November 2012
Adaptive Difficulty
Deleted old discussion and am including link to page that summarizes Ian Stewart's ideas:adaptive difficulty
New Discussion Here