# Difference between revisions of "BIP 0038"

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− | It is proposed that the resulting Base58Check-encoded string start with a '6'. The number '6' is intended to represent, from the perspective of the user, "a private key that needs something else to be usable" - an umbrella definition that could include keys participating in multisig transactions. The second character ought to give a hint as to what is needed, and for an AES256-encoded key based on this proposal, the uppercase letter P is | + | It is proposed that the resulting Base58Check-encoded string start with a '6'. The number '6' is intended to represent, from the perspective of the user, "a private key that needs something else to be usable" - an umbrella definition that could include keys participating in multisig transactions. The second character ought to give a hint as to what is needed, and for an AES256-encoded key based on this proposal, the uppercase letter P is proposed. |

− | + | To keep the size of the encrypted key down, no initialization vectors (IVs) are used in the AES encryption. Rather, suitable values for IV-like use are derived using scrypt from the passphrase and from using a 32-bit hash of the resulting Bitcoin address as salt. | |

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===Proposed specification=== | ===Proposed specification=== |

## Revision as of 19:27, 21 November 2012

## Contents

## Proposed encoding for a passphrase-protected private key

**User story:**As a Bitcoin user who uses paper wallets, I would like the ability to add encryption, so that my Bitcoin paper storage can be two factor: something I have plus something I know.**User story:**As a Bitcoin user who would like to pay a person or a company with a private key, I do not want to worry that any part of the communication path may result in the interception of the key and theft of my funds. I would prefer to offer an encrypted private key, and then follow it up with the password using a different communication channel (e.g. a phone call or SMS).**User story:**(EC-multiplied keys) As a user of physical bitcoins, I would like a third party to be able to create password-protected Bitcoin private keys for me, without them knowing the password, so I can benefit from the physical bitcoin without the issuer having access to the private key, but also for it to be possible to memorize the material needed to unlock the physical bitcoin.

This proposal contemplates existence of a private key that requires a decryption passphrase before it can be used. A 32-bit hash of the resulting Bitcoin address is encoded in plaintext within each encrypted key, so it can be correlated to a Bitcoin address with reasonable probability by someone not knowing the passphrase.

This proposal makes use of the following functions and definitions:

**AES256Encrypt, AES256Decrypt**: the simple form of the well-known AES block cipher without consideration for block chaining. Each of these functions takes a 256-bit key and 16 bytes of input, and deterministically yields 16 bytes of output.**SHA256**, a well-known hashing algorithm that takes an arbitrary number of bytes as input and deterministically yields a 32-byte hash.**scrypt**: A well-known key derivation algorithm. It takes the following parameters: (string) password, (string) salt, (int) n, (int) r, (int) p, (int) length, and deterministically yields an array of bytes whose length is equal to the length parameter.**ECMultiply**: Multiplication of an elliptic curve point by a scalar integer with respect to the secp256k1 elliptic curve.**G, N**: Constants defined as part of the secp256k1 elliptic curve. G is an elliptic curve point, and N is a large positive integer.**Base58Check**: a method for encoding arrays of bytes using 58 alphanumeric characters commonly used in the Bitcoin ecosystem.

### Prefix

It is proposed that the resulting Base58Check-encoded string start with a '6'. The number '6' is intended to represent, from the perspective of the user, "a private key that needs something else to be usable" - an umbrella definition that could include keys participating in multisig transactions. The second character ought to give a hint as to what is needed, and for an AES256-encoded key based on this proposal, the uppercase letter P is proposed.

To keep the size of the encrypted key down, no initialization vectors (IVs) are used in the AES encryption. Rather, suitable values for IV-like use are derived using scrypt from the passphrase and from using a 32-bit hash of the resulting Bitcoin address as salt.

### Proposed specification

- Object identifier prefix: 0x0142 (non-EC-multiplied) or 0x0143 (EC-multiplied)
- How the user sees it: 58 characters always starting with '6P'
- Visual cues are present in the third character for visually identifying the EC-multiply and compress flag.

- Count of payload bytes (beyond prefix): 37
- 1 byte (
*flagbyte*):- the most significant two bits are set as follows to preserve the visibility of the EC multiply flag in the prefix. For non-EC-multiplied keys, the bits are 10. For EC-multiplied keys, the bits are 00.
- the bit with value 0x20 when set indicates the key should be converted to a bitcoin address using the compressed public key format.
- remaining bits are reserved for future use (such as specifying different scrypt parameters) and must all be 0

- 4 bytes: SHA256(SHA256(expected_bitcoin_address))[0...3], used both for typo checking and as salt
- 16 bytes: firsthalf: An AES-encrypted key material record (contents depend on whether EC multiplication is used)
- 16 bytes: lasthalf: An AES-encrypted key material record (contents depend on whether EC multiplication is used)

- 1 byte (
- Range in base58check encoding for non-EC-multiplied keys without compression (prefix 6PB):
- Minimum value: 6PBFqPa2USdAvd91kpeDHpeuYsT9JUYLZDCVLQUpLZi4mJssFEpKogvS6o (based on 01 42 80 plus thirty-six 00's)
- Maximum value: 6PBUZ9doU2eKa41QonTZouLJuRx473NPAWqUDgPcPTxpsPoztkkXPQSyKU (based on 01 42 80 plus thirty-six FF's)

- Range in base58check encoding for non-EC-multiplied keys with compression (prefix 6PJ):
- Minimum value: 6PJGsherFDFwaLwjPcmXtQPntoQGzb3n2wbsdBcDwPrQ82k5wkinjNnZkp (based on 01 42 A0 plus thirty-six 00's)
- Maximum value: 6PJVbTidEoH6Dmp8SaatQV5CFMuBo9speFErWTX1zJ7AE7gDbGezKyKqmt (based on 01 42 A0 plus thirty-six FF's)

- Range in base58check encoding for EC-multiplied keys without compression (prefix 6Pf):
- Minimum value: 6PfKzduKZXAFXWMtJ19Vg9cSvbFg4va6U8p2VWzSjtHQCCLk3JSBpUvfpf (based on 01 43 00 plus thirty-six 00's)
- Maximum value: 6PfYiPy6Z7BQAwEHLxxrCEHrH9kasVQ95ST1NnuEnnYAJHGsgpNPQ9dTHc (based on 01 43 00 plus thirty-six FF's)

- Range in base58check encoding for non-EC-multiplied keys with compression (prefix 6Pn):
- Minimum value: 6PnM2wz9LHo2BEAbvoGpGjMLGXCom35XwsDQnJ7rLiRjYvCxjpLenmoBsR (based on 01 43 20 plus thirty-six 00's)
- Maximum value: 6PnZki3vKspApf2zym6Anp2jd5hiZbuaZArPfa2ePcgVf196PLGrQNyVUh (based on 01 43 20 plus thirty-six FF's)

#### Encryption when EC multiply flag is not used

Encrypting a private key without the EC multiplication offers the advantage that any known private key can be encrypted. The party performing the encryption must know the passphrase.

Encryption steps:

- Compute the Bitcoin address (ASCII), and take the first four bytes of SHA256(SHA256()) of it. Let's call this "addresshash".
- Derive a key from the passphrase using scrypt
- Parameters:
*passphrase*is the passphrase itself encoded in UTF-8.*addresshash*came from the earlier step, n=1048576, r=8, p=16, length=64 - Let's split the resulting 64 bytes in half, and call them
*derivedhalf1*and*derivedhalf2*.

- Parameters:
- Do AES256Encrypt(bitcoinprivkey[0...15] xor derivedhalf1[0...15], derivedhalf2), call the 16-byte result
*encryptedhalf1* - Do AES256Encrypt(bitcoinprivkey[16...31] xor derivedhalf1[16...31], derivedhalf2), call the 16-byte result
*encryptedhalf2*

The encrypted private key is the Base58Check-encoded concatenation of the following:

- 0x0142 +
*flagbyte*+*salt*+*encryptedhalf1*+*encryptedhalf2*

#### Encryption when EC multiply mode is used

Encrypting a private key with EC multiplication offers the ability for someone to generate encrypted keys knowing only an EC point derived from the original passphrase and some salt generated by the passphrase's owner, and without knowing the passphrase itself. Only the person who knows the original passphrase can decrypt the private key. This methodology does not offer the ability to encrypt a known private key - this means that the process of creating encrypted keys is also the process of generating new addresses.

Steps performed by the person with the passphrase (call him the *owner*):

- Generate 16 random bytes, call this
*ownersalt* - Derive a key from the passphrase using scrypt
- Parameters:
*passphrase*is the passphrase itself encoded in UTF-8. salt is*ownersalt*. n=1048576, r=8, p=16, length=32. - Call the resulting 32 bytes
*passfactor*.

- Parameters:
- Compute the elliptic curve point G * passfactor, and convert the result to compressed notation (33 bytes). Call this
*passpoint*. Compressed notation is used here regardless of whether the intent is to create Bitcoin addresses with or without compressed public keys. - Convey
*ownersalt*and*passpoint*to the party generating the keys, along with a checksum to ensure integrity.- The following Base58Check-encoded format is recommended for this purpose: bytes "04 A1 2D 58 B1 85 62" followed by
*ownersalt*and then*passpoint*. The resulting string will start with the word "password", will be 81 characters in length, and encodes 56 bytes (7 bytes constant + 16 bytes*ownersalt*+ 33 bytes*passpoint*). The checksum is handled in the Base58Check encoding.

- The following Base58Check-encoded format is recommended for this purpose: bytes "04 A1 2D 58 B1 85 62" followed by

Steps to create new encrypted private keys given an encrypted password string from *owner* (so we have *ownersalt* and *passpoint*, but we do not have *passfactor* or the passphrase):

- Generate 16 random bytes, call this
*seedb*. Take SHA256(SHA256(*seedb*)) to yield 32 bytes, call this*factorb*. - ECMultiply
*passpoint*by*factorb*. Use the resulting EC point as a public key and hash it into a Bitcoin address using either compressed or uncompressed public key methodology (specify which methodology is used inside*flagbyte*). This is the generated Bitcoin address, call it*generatedaddress*. - Take the first four bytes of SHA256(SHA256(
*generatedaddress*)) and call it*addresshash*. - Now we will encrypt
*seedb*and*ownersalt*. Derive a second key from*passpoint*using scrypt- Parameters:
*passphrase*is*passpoint*provided from the first party (expressed in binary as 33 bytes).*salt*is*addresshash*, n=1048576, r=8, p=16, length=64 - Split the result into two 16-byte halves and call them
*derivedhalf1*and*derivedhalf2*.

- Parameters:
- Do AES256Encrypt(ownersalt xor derivedhalf1[0...15], derivedhalf2), call the 16-byte result
*encryptedownersalt* - Do AES256Encrypt(seedb xor derivedhalf1[16...31], derivedhalf2), call the 16-byte result
*encryptedseedb*

The encrypted private key is the Base58Check-encoded concatenation of the following:

- 0x0142 +
*flagbyte*+*addresshash*+*encryptedownersalt*+*encryptedseedb*

Decryption steps:

- Collect passphrase from user
- Recompute
*passfactor*and*passpoint*using same steps done pre-encryption - Derive decryption key for
*factorb*by passing*passpoint*and*salt*into scrypt function. (*salt*is stored in the base58-encoded encrypted private key) - Decrypt
*encryptedhalf1*and*encryptedhalf2*to yield*factorb*using AES256Decrypt and derived decryption key. - Multiply
*passfactor*by*factorb*mod N to yield the private key associated with*generatedaddress*. - Convert that private key into a Bitcoin address, honoring the compression preference specified in the encrypted key.
- Hash the Bitcoin address, and verify that
*addresshash*from the encrypted private key record matches the hash. If not, report that the passphrase entry was incorrect.