Block size limit controversy: Difference between revisions
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No solutions will be available immediately, however sidechains and lightning are technically capable of being delivered immediately, a hard forking blocksize change is not. |
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== Argument in opposition of increasing the blocksize == | == Argument in opposition of increasing the blocksize == | ||
* A hard fork requires waiting for sufficient consensus. | * A hard fork requires waiting for sufficient consensus. | ||
* Risk of catastrophic consensus failure{{clarification needed}} | |||
* Orphan rate amplification, more reorgs and double-spends due to slower propagation speeds. | * Orphan rate amplification, more reorgs and double-spends due to slower propagation speeds. | ||
* European/American pools at more of a disadvantage compared to the Chinese pools{{why}} | * European/American pools at more of a disadvantage compared to the Chinese pools{{why}} | ||
* No amount of max block size would support all the world's future transactions on the main blockchain (various types of off-chain transactions are the only long-term solution) | * No amount of max block size would support all the world's future transactions on the main blockchain (various types of off-chain transactions are the only long-term solution) | ||
=== Damage to decentalization === | === Damage to decentalization === | ||
* Bitcoin is only useful if it is decentralized because centralization requires trust. Bitcoins value proposition is trustlessness. | * Bitcoin is only useful if it is decentralized because centralization requires trust. Bitcoins value proposition is trustlessness. | ||
* The larger the hash-rate a single miner controls, the more centralized Bitcoin becomes and the more trust using Bitcoin requires. | * The larger the hash-rate a single miner controls, the more centralized Bitcoin becomes and the more trust using Bitcoin requires. | ||
* Running your own full node while mining rather than giving another entity the right to your hash-power decreases the hash-rate of large miners. Those who control hash-power are able to control their own hash power if and only if they run a full node. | * Running your own full node while mining rather than giving another entity the right to your hash-power decreases the hash-rate of large miners. Those who control hash-power are able to control their own hash power if and only if they run a full node. | ||
* Less individuals who control hash-power will run full nodes if running one becomes more expensive. | * Less individuals who control hash-power will run full nodes if running one becomes more expensive. | ||
* Larger blocks leads to more expensive full nodes. | * Larger blocks leads to more expensive full nodes. | ||
* Therefore, larger blocks lead to less hashers running full nodes, which leads to centralized entities having more power, which makes Bitcoin require more trust, which weakens Bitcoins value proposition. | * Therefore, larger blocks lead to less hashers running full nodes, which leads to centralized entities having more power, which makes Bitcoin require more trust, which weakens Bitcoins value proposition. | ||
Revision as of 04:57, 2 June 2015
Argument in favor of increasing the blocksize
- Bigger blocks (more transactions per second)
Argument in opposition of increasing the blocksize
- A hard fork requires waiting for sufficient consensus.
- Risk of catastrophic consensus failure[clarification needed]
- Orphan rate amplification, more reorgs and double-spends due to slower propagation speeds.
- European/American pools at more of a disadvantage compared to the Chinese pools[why?]
- No amount of max block size would support all the world's future transactions on the main blockchain (various types of off-chain transactions are the only long-term solution)
Damage to decentalization
- Bitcoin is only useful if it is decentralized because centralization requires trust. Bitcoins value proposition is trustlessness.
- The larger the hash-rate a single miner controls, the more centralized Bitcoin becomes and the more trust using Bitcoin requires.
- Running your own full node while mining rather than giving another entity the right to your hash-power decreases the hash-rate of large miners. Those who control hash-power are able to control their own hash power if and only if they run a full node.
- Less individuals who control hash-power will run full nodes if running one becomes more expensive.
- Larger blocks leads to more expensive full nodes.
- Therefore, larger blocks lead to less hashers running full nodes, which leads to centralized entities having more power, which makes Bitcoin require more trust, which weakens Bitcoins value proposition.
| Entity | Supports Larger Blocks | Supports Hard Fork |
|---|---|---|
| CoinBase | Yes |