Difference between revisions of "Block size limit controversy"

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(No solutions will be available immediately, however sidechains and lightning are technically capable of being delivered immediately, a hard forking blocksize change is not.)
(Argument in opposition of increasing the blocksize)
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== Argument in opposition of increasing the blocksize ==
 
== Argument in opposition of increasing the blocksize ==
 
* A hard fork requires waiting for sufficient consensus.
 
* A hard fork requires waiting for sufficient consensus.
 +
* Risk of catastrophic consensus failure{{clarification needed}}
 
* Orphan rate amplification, more reorgs and double-spends due to slower propagation speeds.
 
* Orphan rate amplification, more reorgs and double-spends due to slower propagation speeds.
 
* European/American pools at more of a disadvantage compared to the Chinese pools{{why}}
 
* European/American pools at more of a disadvantage compared to the Chinese pools{{why}}
 
* No amount of max block size would support all the world's future transactions on the main blockchain (various types of off-chain transactions are the only long-term solution)
 
* No amount of max block size would support all the world's future transactions on the main blockchain (various types of off-chain transactions are the only long-term solution)
* Risk of catastrophic consensus failure{{clarification needed}}
 
  
 
=== Damage to decentalization ===
 
=== Damage to decentalization ===
 
* Bitcoin is only useful if it is decentralized because centralization requires trust. Bitcoins value proposition is trustlessness.
 
* Bitcoin is only useful if it is decentralized because centralization requires trust. Bitcoins value proposition is trustlessness.
 
 
* The larger the hash-rate a single miner controls, the more centralized Bitcoin becomes and the more trust using Bitcoin requires.
 
* The larger the hash-rate a single miner controls, the more centralized Bitcoin becomes and the more trust using Bitcoin requires.
 
 
* Running your own full node while mining rather than giving another entity the right to your hash-power decreases the hash-rate of large miners. Those who control hash-power are able to control their own hash power if and only if they run a full node.
 
* Running your own full node while mining rather than giving another entity the right to your hash-power decreases the hash-rate of large miners. Those who control hash-power are able to control their own hash power if and only if they run a full node.
 
 
* Less individuals who control hash-power will run full nodes if running one becomes more expensive.
 
* Less individuals who control hash-power will run full nodes if running one becomes more expensive.
 
 
* Larger blocks leads to more expensive full nodes.
 
* Larger blocks leads to more expensive full nodes.
 
 
* Therefore, larger blocks lead to less hashers running full nodes, which leads to centralized entities having more power, which makes Bitcoin require more trust, which weakens Bitcoins value proposition.
 
* Therefore, larger blocks lead to less hashers running full nodes, which leads to centralized entities having more power, which makes Bitcoin require more trust, which weakens Bitcoins value proposition.
  

Revision as of 04:57, 2 June 2015

Argument in favor of increasing the blocksize

  • Bigger blocks (more transactions per second)

Argument in opposition of increasing the blocksize

  • A hard fork requires waiting for sufficient consensus.
  • Risk of catastrophic consensus failure[clarification needed]
  • Orphan rate amplification, more reorgs and double-spends due to slower propagation speeds.
  • European/American pools at more of a disadvantage compared to the Chinese pools[why?]
  • No amount of max block size would support all the world's future transactions on the main blockchain (various types of off-chain transactions are the only long-term solution)

Damage to decentalization

  • Bitcoin is only useful if it is decentralized because centralization requires trust. Bitcoins value proposition is trustlessness.
  • The larger the hash-rate a single miner controls, the more centralized Bitcoin becomes and the more trust using Bitcoin requires.
  • Running your own full node while mining rather than giving another entity the right to your hash-power decreases the hash-rate of large miners. Those who control hash-power are able to control their own hash power if and only if they run a full node.
  • Less individuals who control hash-power will run full nodes if running one becomes more expensive.
  • Larger blocks leads to more expensive full nodes.
  • Therefore, larger blocks lead to less hashers running full nodes, which leads to centralized entities having more power, which makes Bitcoin require more trust, which weakens Bitcoins value proposition.
Entity Supports Larger Blocks Supports Hard Fork
CoinBase Yes