Tor - Revision history

NotATether: Remove spam

2022-08-26T05:55:14Z

Remove spam

← Older revision		Revision as of 05:55, 26 August 2022
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	Check "Connect through socks 4 proxy" with the address 127.0.0.1 and port 9050 (the Tor default port number)<br />		Check "Connect through socks 4 proxy" with the address 127.0.0.1 and port 9050 (the Tor default port number)<br />
	[[{{ns:file}}:20110108-btc-client-tor-as-proxy.png]]<br />		[[{{ns:file}}:20110108-btc-client-tor-as-proxy.png]]<br />
	Configuring an application to use Tor is also called to torify it.		Configuring an application to use Tor is also called to torify it. Briefly, it involves changing the SOCKS5 proxy settings used by the application (for example, <code>wget</code> or a browser) to point to 127.0.0.1:9050. Tor must already be running for this to work, otherwise the programs won't be able to use the internet. Note that HTTP proxies '''cannot''' be used to add the Tor service.
	(~~needs~~ a ~~brief howto here~~)

	''~~the note about bitcoin-otc promote on a more appropriate place in this page? reference to trading and IRC~~''
	~~Conducting business using [[bitcoin-otc]] can~~ be ~~done more anonymously when directly connected~~ to ~~a Freenode IRC hidden~~ service.

	==bitcoind==		==bitcoind==

NotATether: Add wording that I wrote but was trashed by the browser

2022-08-26T05:51:41Z

Add wording that I wrote but was trashed by the browser

← Older revision		Revision as of 05:51, 26 August 2022
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	== Security considerations ==		== Security considerations ==

	Using CJDNS, I2P~~, or Tor~~ alone without other networks may make a node more susceptible to [[Weaknesses#Sybil_attack\|Sybil attacks]]. You can use <code>bitcoin-cli -addrinfo</code> to see the number and type of addresses known to your node.		Using Tor or another anonymity protocol such as CJDNS or I2P alone without other networks may make a node more susceptible to [[Weaknesses#Sybil_attack\|Sybil attacks]]. You can use <code>bitcoin-cli -addrinfo</code> to see the number and type of addresses known to your node.

	If all of your connections are controlled by a Sybil attacker, they can easily prevent you from seeing confirmed transactions and, with more difficulty, even trick your node into falsely reporting a transaction as confirmed on the blockchain.		If all of your connections are controlled by a Sybil attacker, they can easily prevent you from seeing confirmed transactions and, with more difficulty, even trick your node into falsely reporting a transaction as confirmed on the blockchain.

NotATether: Fix the code tags

2022-08-26T05:50:36Z

Fix the code tags

← Older revision		Revision as of 05:50, 26 August 2022
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	== Security considerations ==		== Security considerations ==

	Using CJDNS, I2P, or Tor alone without other networks may make a node more susceptible to [[Weaknesses#Sybil_attack\|Sybil attacks]]. You can use `bitcoin-cli -addrinfo` to see the number and type of addresses known to your node.		Using CJDNS, I2P, or Tor alone without other networks may make a node more susceptible to [[Weaknesses#Sybil_attack\|Sybil attacks]]. You can use <code>bitcoin-cli -addrinfo</code> to see the number and type of addresses known to your node.

	If all of your connections are controlled by a Sybil attacker, they can easily prevent you from seeing confirmed transactions and, with more difficulty, even trick your node into falsely reporting a transaction as confirmed on the blockchain.		If all of your connections are controlled by a Sybil attacker, they can easily prevent you from seeing confirmed transactions and, with more difficulty, even trick your node into falsely reporting a transaction as confirmed on the blockchain.

	This is significantly less of a concern if you make `-addnode` connections to trusted peers (even if they're CJDNS, I2P, or Onion addresses).		This is significantly less of a concern if you make <code>-addnode</code> connections to trusted peers (even if they're CJDNS, I2P, or Onion addresses).
	It's also alleviated with IPv4/IPv6 connections (especially when using the `-asmap` configuration option) due to the cost of obtaining IPs in many networks.		It's also alleviated with IPv4/IPv6 connections (especially when using the <code>-asmap</code> configuration option) due to the cost of obtaining IPs in many networks.
	A connection to a single honest peer is enough to thwart an attempted eclipse attack.		A connection to a single honest peer is enough to thwart an attempted eclipse attack.

NotATether: Migrate contents from https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/25927/

2022-08-26T05:49:35Z

Migrate contents from https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/25927/

← Older revision		Revision as of 05:49, 26 August 2022
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	bitcoind will detect that you are using a proxy on 9050 and will force the "nolisten" flag. If you are not running tor on 9050, you need to set "nolisten" manually otherwise you will listen on your public IP and possibly reveal that you are running a node.		bitcoind will detect that you are using a proxy on 9050 and will force the "nolisten" flag. If you are not running tor on 9050, you need to set "nolisten" manually otherwise you will listen on your public IP and possibly reveal that you are running a node.

			== Security considerations ==

			Using CJDNS, I2P, or Tor alone without other networks may make a node more susceptible to [[Weaknesses#Sybil_attack\|Sybil attacks]]. You can use `bitcoin-cli -addrinfo` to see the number and type of addresses known to your node.

			If all of your connections are controlled by a Sybil attacker, they can easily prevent you from seeing confirmed transactions and, with more difficulty, even trick your node into falsely reporting a transaction as confirmed on the blockchain.

			This is significantly less of a concern if you make `-addnode` connections to trusted peers (even if they're CJDNS, I2P, or Onion addresses).
			It's also alleviated with IPv4/IPv6 connections (especially when using the `-asmap` configuration option) due to the cost of obtaining IPs in many networks.
			A connection to a single honest peer is enough to thwart an attempted eclipse attack.

			== Network Partitioning ==

			If too many of the single network nodes use onlynet=[network], it could become difficult for the nodes to communicate with the rest of the entire Bitcoin network, increasing the chance of network partitioning. It is essential that some nodes access a combination of networks.

	=Hidden services=		=Hidden services=

Manu: /* Bitcoin Core */

2022-06-17T21:26:35Z

Bitcoin Core

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:26, 17 June 2022
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	= Bitcoin Core =		= Bitcoin Core =

	''~~See~~ also [https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/tor.md Bitcoin Core instructions for Tor]''		See [[Setting_up_a_Tor_hidden_service\|Setting up a Tor hidden service]], ''see also [https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/tor.md Bitcoin Core instructions for Tor]''.

	==GUI==		==GUI==

Manu: /* Tor installation & use */

2022-06-17T21:24:18Z

Tor installation & use

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:24, 17 June 2022
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	[[{{ns:file}}:20110109-bitcoin-mirc-vidalia.png]]		[[{{ns:file}}:20110109-bitcoin-mirc-vidalia.png]]

	Note on 2022: This project that executes Tor service on Windows with the above interface, and display an icon on the taskbar is called Tor Vidalia Bundle and it's not maintained anymore, deprecated and not recommended. To see how to configure Tor service on Linx or Windows check [[Setting_up_a_Tor_hidden_service\|Setting up a Tor hidden service]].		'''Note on 2022''': This project that executes Tor service on Windows with the above interface, and display an icon on the taskbar is called Tor Vidalia Bundle and it's not maintained anymore, deprecated and not recommended. To see how to configure Tor service on Linx or Windows check [[Setting_up_a_Tor_hidden_service\|Setting up a Tor hidden service]].

	= Bitcoin Core =		= Bitcoin Core =

Manu: Adding info about Tor Vidalia Bundle

2022-06-17T21:24:05Z

Adding info about Tor Vidalia Bundle

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:24, 17 June 2022
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	[[{{ns:file}}:20110109-tor-running.png]] On the taskbar of your compute you'll see a small green onion when Tor is running.		[[{{ns:file}}:20110109-tor-running.png]] On the taskbar of your compute you'll see a small green onion when Tor is running.
	[[{{ns:file}}:20110109-bitcoin-mirc-vidalia.png]]		[[{{ns:file}}:20110109-bitcoin-mirc-vidalia.png]]

			Note on 2022: This project that executes Tor service on Windows with the above interface, and display an icon on the taskbar is called Tor Vidalia Bundle and it's not maintained anymore, deprecated and not recommended. To see how to configure Tor service on Linx or Windows check [[Setting_up_a_Tor_hidden_service\|Setting up a Tor hidden service]].

	= Bitcoin Core =		= Bitcoin Core =

Belcher: Added note about partition resistance

2019-02-15T20:00:49Z

Added note about partition resistance

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:00, 15 February 2019
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	'''Tor''' is a distributed 'onion' network, that makes it more difficult for an adversary to track any one peer on the network. Tor also is very useful to access the 'uncensored' internet in countries such as China and Iran. Preserving privacy means not only hiding the content of messages, but also hiding who is talking to whom (traffic analysis). Tor provides anonymous connections that are strongly resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis.		'''Tor''' is a distributed 'onion' network, that makes it more difficult for an adversary to track any one peer on the network. Tor also is very useful to access the 'uncensored' internet in countries such as China and Iran. Bitcoin's security model assumes that your node is well connected to the rest of the network, so even in less-censored countries using bitcoin over both Tor and clearnet can avoid being partitioned from the network by the internet service provider. Preserving privacy means not only hiding the content of messages, but also hiding who is talking to whom (traffic analysis). Tor provides anonymous connections that are strongly resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis.

	Bitcoin can run easily on the Tor network.		Bitcoin can run easily on the Tor network.

Belcher: /* External links */ Moved from category Security to category Privacy

2019-02-15T19:48:39Z

External links: Moved from category Security to category Privacy

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:48, 15 February 2019
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	* [http://freenode.net/sasl/ Freenode resources on SASL]		* [http://freenode.net/sasl/ Freenode resources on SASL]

	[[Category:~~Security~~]]		[[Category:Privacy]]

Harding: Link to Bitcoin Core instructions for Tor https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/tor.md

2015-09-03T10:58:49Z

Link to Bitcoin Core instructions for Tor https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/tor.md

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:58, 3 September 2015
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	[[{{ns:file}}:20110109-bitcoin-mirc-vidalia.png]]		[[{{ns:file}}:20110109-bitcoin-mirc-vidalia.png]]

	=GUI=		= Bitcoin Core =

			''See also [https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/tor.md Bitcoin Core instructions for Tor]''

			==GUI==
	Once you have your Tor client up & running, you can configure your Bitcoin client to use it.<br />		Once you have your Tor client up & running, you can configure your Bitcoin client to use it.<br />
	Select in menu Settings -> Options<br />		Select in menu Settings -> Options<br />
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	Conducting business using [[bitcoin-otc]] can be done more anonymously when directly connected to a Freenode IRC hidden service.		Conducting business using [[bitcoin-otc]] can be done more anonymously when directly connected to a Freenode IRC hidden service.

	=bitcoind=		==bitcoind==

	Run bitcoind with -proxy=127.0.0.1:9050 (or whatever your SocksPort is).		Run bitcoind with -proxy=127.0.0.1:9050 (or whatever your SocksPort is).