NotATether: fix PoonDryja en-dash (restore approved wording)

2026-09-06T07:53:15Z

fix PoonDryja en-dash (restore approved wording)

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:53, 6 September 2026
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	'''Eltoo''' (also called '''LN-Symmetry''') is a proposed [[Lightning Network]] channel update mechanism in which any later channel state can replace any earlier state on chain without a punitive justice transaction. The paper ''eltoo: A Simple Layer2 Protocol for Bitcoin'' by Christian Decker, Rusty Russell, and Olaoluwa Osuntokun described update and settlement transactions that rebind to prior outputs. Deploying that pattern on Bitcoin requires a consensus change that makes signatures rebindable across different prevouts, commonly discussed as [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0118.mediawiki BIP 118] <code>SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT</code> or later Taproot-native covenant bundles such as BIP 448.		'''Eltoo''' (also called '''LN-Symmetry''') is a proposed [[Lightning Network]] channel update mechanism in which any later channel state can replace any earlier state on chain without a punitive justice transaction. The paper ''eltoo: A Simple Layer2 Protocol for Bitcoin'' by Christian Decker, Rusty Russell, and Olaoluwa Osuntokun described update and settlement transactions that rebind to prior outputs. Deploying that pattern on Bitcoin requires a consensus change that makes signatures rebindable across different prevouts, commonly discussed as [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0118.mediawiki BIP 118] <code>SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT</code> or later Taproot-native covenant bundles such as BIP 448.

	Today's Lightning channels use ~~PoonDryja~~ revocation. Each state update exchanges revocation secrets for the prior commitment. If an old commitment is broadcast, the other party can sweep the cheater's funds after a delay. Eltoo replaces punishment-as-primary-security with a latest-state-wins rule. Publishing an old update is mainly a fee cost if the honest party can still put a newer update on chain before settlement finalizes. Both parties can hold identical transaction sets. Without a soft fork, Bitcoin Script cannot express that rebinding behavior for Taproot spends in the form eltoo needs. Until such a rule activates on mainnet, eltoo channels remain limited to signet, regtest, and research implementations. Related [[Channel factory\|channel factory]] and multiparty designs often assume eltoo or an equivalent covenant because revocation trees scale poorly with the number of participants.		Today's Lightning channels use Poon–Dryja revocation. Each state update exchanges revocation secrets for the prior commitment. If an old commitment is broadcast, the other party can sweep the cheater's funds after a delay. Eltoo replaces punishment-as-primary-security with a latest-state-wins rule. Publishing an old update is mainly a fee cost if the honest party can still put a newer update on chain before settlement finalizes. Both parties can hold identical transaction sets. Without a soft fork, Bitcoin Script cannot express that rebinding behavior for Taproot spends in the form eltoo needs. Until such a rule activates on mainnet, eltoo channels remain limited to signet, regtest, and research implementations. Related [[Channel factory\|channel factory]] and multiparty designs often assume eltoo or an equivalent covenant because revocation trees scale poorly with the number of participants.

	== See also ==		== See also ==

NotATether: create Eltoo stub (LN-Symmetry, BIP 118 ANYPREVOUT, not activated)

2026-09-06T07:50:00Z

create Eltoo stub (LN-Symmetry, BIP 118 ANYPREVOUT, not activated)

New page

'''Eltoo''' (also called '''LN-Symmetry''') is a proposed [[Lightning Network]] channel update mechanism in which any later channel state can replace any earlier state on chain without a punitive justice transaction. The paper ''eltoo: A Simple Layer2 Protocol for Bitcoin'' by Christian Decker, Rusty Russell, and Olaoluwa Osuntokun described update and settlement transactions that rebind to prior outputs. Deploying that pattern on Bitcoin requires a consensus change that makes signatures rebindable across different prevouts, commonly discussed as [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0118.mediawiki BIP 118] <code>SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT</code> or later Taproot-native covenant bundles such as BIP 448.

Today's Lightning channels use PoonDryja revocation. Each state update exchanges revocation secrets for the prior commitment. If an old commitment is broadcast, the other party can sweep the cheater's funds after a delay. Eltoo replaces punishment-as-primary-security with a latest-state-wins rule. Publishing an old update is mainly a fee cost if the honest party can still put a newer update on chain before settlement finalizes. Both parties can hold identical transaction sets. Without a soft fork, Bitcoin Script cannot express that rebinding behavior for Taproot spends in the form eltoo needs. Until such a rule activates on mainnet, eltoo channels remain limited to signet, regtest, and research implementations. Related [[Channel factory|channel factory]] and multiparty designs often assume eltoo or an equivalent covenant because revocation trees scale poorly with the number of participants.

== See also ==

* [[Lightning Network]]
* [[Payment channels]]
* [[Channel factory]]
* [[Hashed Timelock Contracts]]

== External links ==

* [https://blockstream.com/eltoo.pdf eltoo: A Simple Layer2 Protocol for Bitcoin]
* [https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/eltoo/ Bitcoin Optech: Eltoo]
* [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0118.mediawiki BIP 118: SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT for Taproot Scripts]
* [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0448.md BIP 448: Taproot-native (Re)bindable Transactions]

[[Category:Technical]]

Eltoo - Revision history

NotATether: fix PoonDryja en-dash (restore approved wording)

NotATether: create Eltoo stub (LN-Symmetry, BIP 118 ANYPREVOUT, not activated)