Drivechain - Revision history

NotATether: Add Hashrate escrow, BMM, and Status sections

2026-09-13T07:29:16Z

Add Hashrate escrow, BMM, and Status sections

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:29, 13 September 2026
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	'''Drivechain''' is a proposed Bitcoin [[Sidechain\|sidechain]] design by Paul Sztorc that would let miners custody pegged bitcoin through long hashrate-voted withdrawals and would let those miners collect sidechain fees through blind merged mining. The design is specified mainly as BIP 300 (hashrate escrow) and BIP 301 (blind merged mining). Neither BIP is activated on Bitcoin mainnet, and consensus change proposals implementing them have not been merged into Bitcoin Core.		'''Drivechain''' is a proposed Bitcoin [[Sidechain\|sidechain]] design by Paul Sztorc that would let miners custody pegged bitcoin through long hashrate-voted withdrawals and would let those miners collect sidechain fees through blind merged mining. The design is specified mainly as BIP 300 (hashrate escrow) and BIP 301 (blind merged mining). Neither BIP is activated on Bitcoin mainnet, and consensus change proposals implementing them have not been merged into Bitcoin Core.

			== Hashrate escrow ==

	BIP 300 introduces hashrate escrow outputs that lock bitcoin to a named sidechain. Withdrawals are proposed as compact commitments. Miners then vote in coinbase signals over a long period measured in months. If enough cumulative work supports a withdrawal proposal through the voting window, the escrow releases mainchain bitcoin to the withdrawal destinations. BIP 301 describes blind merged mining, in which sidechain block producers compete to pay Bitcoin miners for inclusion of a sidechain tip commitment without requiring those miners to fully validate the sidechain. A Bitcoin Core pull request attempting BIP 300 consensus logic ([https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28311 PR 28311]) was opened as a work in progress and later closed without merge. No BIP 300 or BIP 301 rules are enforced by Bitcoin mainnet nodes today.		BIP 300 introduces hashrate escrow outputs that lock bitcoin to a named sidechain. Withdrawals are proposed as compact commitments. Miners then vote in coinbase signals over a long period measured in months. If enough cumulative work supports a withdrawal proposal through the voting window, the escrow releases mainchain bitcoin to the withdrawal destinations. BIP 301 describes blind merged mining, in which sidechain block producers compete to pay Bitcoin miners for inclusion of a sidechain tip commitment without requiring those miners to fully validate the sidechain. A Bitcoin Core pull request attempting BIP 300 consensus logic ([https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28311 PR 28311]) was opened as a work in progress and later closed without merge. No BIP 300 or BIP 301 rules are enforced by Bitcoin mainnet nodes today.
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	BIP 300 withdrawal windows are measured in thousands of blocks so that hashpower can respond to a contested peg-out before coins unlock. A minority of miners cannot instantly steal escrowed value, but a persistent majority could still vote through a dishonest withdrawal. Sidechain nodes must watch mainchain coinbases for those votes independently of ordinary Bitcoin wallet software.		BIP 300 withdrawal windows are measured in thousands of blocks so that hashpower can respond to a contested peg-out before coins unlock. A minority of miners cannot instantly steal escrowed value, but a persistent majority could still vote through a dishonest withdrawal. Sidechain nodes must watch mainchain coinbases for those votes independently of ordinary Bitcoin wallet software.

			== Blind merged mining ==

	Blind merged mining commitments are small mainchain outputs or coinbase fields that name a sidechain tip. Miners choose among competing commitments by fee, similar to other optional coinbase services. If mainchain miners ignore a sidechain, that chain's tip progress stalls even when its own users remain active.		Blind merged mining commitments are small mainchain outputs or coinbase fields that name a sidechain tip. Miners choose among competing commitments by fee, similar to other optional coinbase services. If mainchain miners ignore a sidechain, that chain's tip progress stalls even when its own users remain active.

			Sidechain block producers still compete among themselves under BIP 301. Mainchain miners only select which tip commitment to include, typically by fee, without validating sidechain transactions.

			== Status ==

			Neither BIP 300 nor BIP 301 is active on Bitcoin mainnet. Bitcoin Core has not merged consensus code for hashrate escrow. Designs such as federated pegs or [[BitVM]]-style bridges use different trust assumptions and do not require miner withdrawal voting.


	== See also ==		== See also ==

NotATether: Expand See also links

2026-09-13T07:27:44Z

Expand See also links

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:27, 13 September 2026
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	* [[Softfork]]		* [[Softfork]]
	* [[Merged mining]]		* [[Merged mining]]
			* [[BitVM]]

	== External links ==		== External links ==

NotATether: Add BMM miner fee-market note

2026-09-13T07:27:42Z

Add BMM miner fee-market note

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:27, 13 September 2026
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	BIP 300 withdrawal windows are measured in thousands of blocks so that hashpower can respond to a contested peg-out before coins unlock. A minority of miners cannot instantly steal escrowed value, but a persistent majority could still vote through a dishonest withdrawal. Sidechain nodes must watch mainchain coinbases for those votes independently of ordinary Bitcoin wallet software.		BIP 300 withdrawal windows are measured in thousands of blocks so that hashpower can respond to a contested peg-out before coins unlock. A minority of miners cannot instantly steal escrowed value, but a persistent majority could still vote through a dishonest withdrawal. Sidechain nodes must watch mainchain coinbases for those votes independently of ordinary Bitcoin wallet software.

			Blind merged mining commitments are small mainchain outputs or coinbase fields that name a sidechain tip. Miners choose among competing commitments by fee, similar to other optional coinbase services. If mainchain miners ignore a sidechain, that chain's tip progress stalls even when its own users remain active.

	== See also ==		== See also ==

NotATether: Add withdrawal window and majority-hashpower caveat

2026-09-13T07:27:40Z

Add withdrawal window and majority-hashpower caveat

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:27, 13 September 2026
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	Hashrate escrow voting is intentionally slow so that a hostile withdrawal can be rejected by honest hashpower before coins leave the mainchain lock. Sidechain operators still need their own consensus rules, block producers, and users. Blind merged mining pays Bitcoin miners for committing to a sidechain tip without requiring those miners to run full sidechain validation. Critics argue that miner custody of pegged coins concentrates trust in hashpower and that failed withdrawals or soft-fork politics could strand sidechain users. Supporters argue the design avoids federated peg custodians and reuses Bitcoin's existing proof-of-work security budget.		Hashrate escrow voting is intentionally slow so that a hostile withdrawal can be rejected by honest hashpower before coins leave the mainchain lock. Sidechain operators still need their own consensus rules, block producers, and users. Blind merged mining pays Bitcoin miners for committing to a sidechain tip without requiring those miners to run full sidechain validation. Critics argue that miner custody of pegged coins concentrates trust in hashpower and that failed withdrawals or soft-fork politics could strand sidechain users. Supporters argue the design avoids federated peg custodians and reuses Bitcoin's existing proof-of-work security budget.

			BIP 300 withdrawal windows are measured in thousands of blocks so that hashpower can respond to a contested peg-out before coins unlock. A minority of miners cannot instantly steal escrowed value, but a persistent majority could still vote through a dishonest withdrawal. Sidechain nodes must watch mainchain coinbases for those votes independently of ordinary Bitcoin wallet software.

	== See also ==		== See also ==

NotATether: Expand See also links

2026-09-12T21:10:49Z

Expand See also links

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:10, 12 September 2026
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	* [[Sidechain]]		* [[Sidechain]]
	* [[Softfork]]		* [[Softfork]]
			* [[Merged mining]]

	== External links ==		== External links ==

NotATether: Add mechanism and debate summary from BIP 300/301 context

2026-09-12T21:10:47Z

Add mechanism and debate summary from BIP 300/301 context

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:10, 12 September 2026
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	BIP 300 introduces hashrate escrow outputs that lock bitcoin to a named sidechain. Withdrawals are proposed as compact commitments. Miners then vote in coinbase signals over a long period measured in months. If enough cumulative work supports a withdrawal proposal through the voting window, the escrow releases mainchain bitcoin to the withdrawal destinations. BIP 301 describes blind merged mining, in which sidechain block producers compete to pay Bitcoin miners for inclusion of a sidechain tip commitment without requiring those miners to fully validate the sidechain. A Bitcoin Core pull request attempting BIP 300 consensus logic ([https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28311 PR 28311]) was opened as a work in progress and later closed without merge. No BIP 300 or BIP 301 rules are enforced by Bitcoin mainnet nodes today.		BIP 300 introduces hashrate escrow outputs that lock bitcoin to a named sidechain. Withdrawals are proposed as compact commitments. Miners then vote in coinbase signals over a long period measured in months. If enough cumulative work supports a withdrawal proposal through the voting window, the escrow releases mainchain bitcoin to the withdrawal destinations. BIP 301 describes blind merged mining, in which sidechain block producers compete to pay Bitcoin miners for inclusion of a sidechain tip commitment without requiring those miners to fully validate the sidechain. A Bitcoin Core pull request attempting BIP 300 consensus logic ([https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28311 PR 28311]) was opened as a work in progress and later closed without merge. No BIP 300 or BIP 301 rules are enforced by Bitcoin mainnet nodes today.

			Hashrate escrow voting is intentionally slow so that a hostile withdrawal can be rejected by honest hashpower before coins leave the mainchain lock. Sidechain operators still need their own consensus rules, block producers, and users. Blind merged mining pays Bitcoin miners for committing to a sidechain tip without requiring those miners to run full sidechain validation. Critics argue that miner custody of pegged coins concentrates trust in hashpower and that failed withdrawals or soft-fork politics could strand sidechain users. Supporters argue the design avoids federated peg custodians and reuses Bitcoin's existing proof-of-work security budget.

	== See also ==		== See also ==

NotATether: create Drivechain stub (BIP 300/301, not activated, PR 28311 closed)

2026-09-06T08:03:25Z

create Drivechain stub (BIP 300/301, not activated, PR 28311 closed)

New page

'''Drivechain''' is a proposed Bitcoin [[Sidechain|sidechain]] design by Paul Sztorc that would let miners custody pegged bitcoin through long hashrate-voted withdrawals and would let those miners collect sidechain fees through blind merged mining. The design is specified mainly as BIP 300 (hashrate escrow) and BIP 301 (blind merged mining). Neither BIP is activated on Bitcoin mainnet, and consensus change proposals implementing them have not been merged into Bitcoin Core.

BIP 300 introduces hashrate escrow outputs that lock bitcoin to a named sidechain. Withdrawals are proposed as compact commitments. Miners then vote in coinbase signals over a long period measured in months. If enough cumulative work supports a withdrawal proposal through the voting window, the escrow releases mainchain bitcoin to the withdrawal destinations. BIP 301 describes blind merged mining, in which sidechain block producers compete to pay Bitcoin miners for inclusion of a sidechain tip commitment without requiring those miners to fully validate the sidechain. A Bitcoin Core pull request attempting BIP 300 consensus logic ([https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28311 PR 28311]) was opened as a work in progress and later closed without merge. No BIP 300 or BIP 301 rules are enforced by Bitcoin mainnet nodes today.

== See also ==

* [[Sidechain]]
* [[Softfork]]

== External links ==

* [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0300.mediawiki BIP 300: Hashrate Escrows]
* [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0301.mediawiki BIP 301: Blind Merged Mining]
* [https://drivechain.info/ Drivechain project site]
* [https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28311 Bitcoin Core PR 28311 (BIP 300 WIP, closed unmerged)]

[[Category:Technical]]